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SIGNALS, THREATS, AND DETERRENCE:
ALIVE AND WELL IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Glenn R. Butterton*
Taiwan held its first democratic presidential elections in March
1996, which motivated mainland China to stage large scale con-
temporaneous war games in the Taiwan Strait and aim unusually
belligerent rhetoric at Taipei. The United States responded by
deploying substantial naval forces in the area. After examining
this confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States
in terms of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, international law, and
non-nuclear deterrence theory, the author presents a novel analy-
sis of indirect deterrence communication between the United
States and China.
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I. INTRODUCTION
March 1996 was an anxious time in Taiwan. World attention focused
on the Taiwan Strait where China, Taiwan, and the United States seemed
perilously close to armed conflict. In time, tensions abated, and military
forces stood down. What took them to, and brought them back from, the
brink? In a word, deterrence. China had put on a large show of military
force in the form of missile tests and war games, with the aim of deterring
Taiwanese voters from casting ballots for incumbent President Lee Teng-
hui. The Chinese effort failed insofar as Mr. Lee won a decisive victory.1
The United States also put on a show of substantial force, but appears to
have enjoyed significantly greater success. The U.S. objective was the
deterrence of prospective Chinese aggression against Taiwan. The effort
1. Lee and the leading "pro-independence" candidate, Peng Ming-Min, received
54% and 21% of the votes for president, respectively, giving them a combined total of
75%. See Patrick E. Tyler, Taiwan's Leader Wins Its Election And A Mandate, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996, § 1, at 1. Out of 15 million eligible voters, 11 million (76%) cast a
ballot. See 56 FACTS ON FILE 193, 194 (March 28, 1996) (noting the election results); THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1996, at 822 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1995) (cit-
ing Taiwan's population statistics); see also infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the election results). A similar but more successful Chinese effort four months
earlier, in December 1995, sought to deter Taiwanese voters from casting ballots for "pro-
independence" candidates in parliamentary elections. In that contest, Mr. Lee's Nation-
alist Party, the Kuomintang, had its majority in the 164-seat parliament reduced to 85,
while the Chinese New Party, which took a conciliatory stance toward Beijing, gained 14
seats, increasing its total to 21. See Rone Tempest, Taiwan's Ruling Party Escapes With
Narrow Majority in Vote, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, at A20. The Democratic Progressive
Party, which favored outright independence from Beijing, also gained four seats, raising its
total to 54. See id. Minor parties took the remaining seats. Fewer than 68% of those eli-
gible to vote cast a ballot. See 1 EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 866 (1996) [hereinafter
EUROPA]; see also Willy Wo-Lap Lam & Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, Beijing To Step Up
Pressure On Taipei, So. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 4, 1995, at I (discussing the out-
come of the 1995 elections). China's partial success against "pro-independence" candi-
dates in the parliamentary elections appears to have inspired the expression "missile di-
plomacy" and emboldened Beijing in its subsequent unsuccessful attempt to sway the
outcome of the presidential election. See infra note 2 (noting Beijing's subsequent efforts
at "missile diplomacy").
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succeeded to the extent that the Chinese did not attack, formally block-
ade, cause an "accidental" mishap, or otherwise further menace Taiwan
during or after the war games.2 Thus, greater tension, armed conflict,
perhaps even war, were averted. In this manner, the United States ap-
pears to have made efficient use of the threat of force, without ever actu-
ally using force, to guide events to a pacific outcome.
We will likely not know for some time, if ever, the nature of the actual
deliberations which led to a Chinese withdrawal, or to the American de-
cision to position a formidable military presence near Taiwan and China
at a moment of high tension. But, let us assume that Washington did de-
ter Beijing, that the timely deployment of U.S. naval assets-two aircraft
carrier battle groups and other vessels-coupled with Washington's pub-
lic and private statements about the crisis, did in fact play a key role in
motivating Chinese decision makers to holster their ambitions, and kept
a dangerous situation from escalating.' If deterrence did work, a host of
questions naturally arise about the mechanisms, consequences, and legal
character of its success. In this article, I shall ask three of those questions
whose answers help explain how the United States unilaterally used the
threat of force (military, and to some extent, economic) to deter aggres-
sion by China. My first and second questions probe the legality of
American actions. If the United States made efficient use of the threat
of force in the Strait: (1) Did it remain within the constraints of domestic
U.S. law. Did it, in particular, adhere to the terms of the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act of 1979? (2) Asking a similar question from a transnational
point of view: Did the United States remain within the constraints of in-
ternational law? Did it, for example, violate international norms or pro-
hibitions on the use of force, such as those spelled out in relevant provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter and elsewhere?
My third and most ambitious question is, in part, an operational one
whose answer takes the form of a "how to" lesson. In broad form this
2. Two months before the presidential election, in January 1996, Beijing informed
Washington of its plan to subject Taiwan to a month-long barrage of missiles, firing one a
day for thirty days. See Patrick E. Tyler, As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S.
Listens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at A3; see also infra note 67 and accompanying text
(documenting expansion of China's "live fire" war games). For purposes of this article, I
assume the truth of the counterfactual: if the U.S. had not mounted a show of force, the
Chinese would have attacked, invaded, or taken other comparatively aggressive action to-
ward Taiwan.
3. There is, of course, an epistemological veil over private communications between
the parties which to date has been only partially lifted. See infra note 138 (discussing a
March 7, 1996 working lunch between U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry and Liu
Huaqiu, Foreign Affairs Director of China's State Council, during which tensions in the
Taiwan Strait were discussed).
1997]
Catholic University Law Review
question asks: If Washington did deter Beijing, how did it signal its inten-
tion to do so? What exactly were the connections between the signaling
and the threat of force? Was the threat direct or indirect? Were the
same methods employed by the Chinese? From a signaling point of view,
what were the mechanisms of belief, reason, and action that prevented
conflict and kept the peace? Furthermore, were there notable connec-
tions between this question and my first question, between, for example,
U.S. signaling behavior and the interpretation of relevant U.S. law?
Considerable effort has been invested over the years in various theoreti-
cal accounts of deterrence and strategic decision making in the nuclear
context, and this work has made important contributions to our general
understanding of the logic of decision.4 However, little work has been
4. See generally GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1971) (discussing the strategic aspects of the Cuban Missile cri-
sis); BERNARD BRODIE, ESCALATION AND THE NUCLEAR OPTION 3 (1966) (arguing in
favor of threatening the use of the "miserable bomb"); BERNARD BRODIE, STRATEGY IN
THE MISSILE AGE 264-304 (1959) (discussing "the anatomy of deterrence" in the nuclear
age); LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY 3 (2d ed. 1989)
(asserting that the modern concept of nuclear war was derived from the "strategic bom-
bardment" doctrine of the post-1945 era, which was premised on the belief that attacking
an enemy's social and industrial centers was the most effective way to avoid a repeat of the
"murderous stalemate" experienced in World War I); ALEXANDER L. GEORGE &
RICHARD SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 11 (1974) ("[D]eterrence is simply the persuasion of one's opponent that the
costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.");
ROBERT JERVIS, THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3 (1970) (dis-
cussing methods which alter a state's image and exercise influence without modifying poli-
cies); ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
3 (1976) (arguing that perception plays a critical role in understanding international rela-
tions); HERMAN KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR 3 (2d ed. 1969) (considering foreign
and defense policies from the perspective of various military postures and corresponding
strategies used by the United States and the Soviet Union); HERMAN KAHN, THINKING
ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE 101 (1962) (discussing deterrence in the thermonuclear
arena); ROBERT POWELL, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THEORY: THE SEARCH FOR
CREDIBILITY (1990) (reviewing various approaches states employ to threaten nuclear at-
tack and maintain credibility among their adversaries); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS
AND INFLUENCE 1 (1966) (characterizing diplomacy as a bargaining process in which op-
ponents achieve objectives that are less than ideal, yet better than the alternatives);
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960) (examining various theo-
ries and strategies of conflict); J. DAVID SINGER, DETERRENCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND
DISARMAMENT 56-86 (1962) (considering perceptions in deterrence); GLENN H. SNYDER,
DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE 3 (1961) (defining "deterrence" as "discouraging the enemy
from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his
prospective gain," and "defense" as "reducing our own prospective costs and risks in the
event that deterrence fails"); Bernard Brodie, Implications for Military Policy, in THE
ABSOLUTE WEAPON: ATOMIC POWER AND THE WORLD ORDER 70-107 (Bernard Bro-
die ed., 1946) (discussing the impact of atomic weapons on military policy); Robert Jervis,
Deterrence and Perception, 7 INT'L. SECURITY 3, 3 (1982-83) (explaining the importance
of perception in methods of deterrence); Bruce M. Russett, The Calculus of Deterrence, 7
[Vol. 47:51
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done on the basic signaling and communication mechanisms involved in
non-nuclear deterrence situations, and less still on the role of those
mechanisms in the interpretation of law. In this article, I mean to con-
tribute to the scholarship in this area by examining the Taiwan Strait in-
cident and discussing the role some of those mechanisms played in its
resolution.
The crisis featured a number of quite public communications between
U.S. and Chinese officials. On rare occasions, the communication was
very direct, as when the U.S. Senate urged China to "cease its bellicose
actions directed at Taiwan."5 However, on the vast majority of occa-
sions, the communication was rather indirect, as in December 1995, when
the United States sent an armada through the Taiwan Strait for the first
time since the normalization of Sino-American relations in 1978, or when
Beijing recalled its ambassador to Washington following the U.S. deci-
sion to issue a visa to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui. On these occa-
sions, both sides understood that "messages" were being sent. Likewise,
one might say that in the "totality of the circumstances," many other acts
by both sides were not simple acts of, for example, expulsion, arrest, re-
call, arms transfer, ship deployment, and so on.' Rather, something was
"meant" by these acts: they were used both to expel, arrest, recall, trans-
fer or deploy, and also to signal the intention to communicate and actu-
ally communicate "messages" to the interlocutor, messages such as, "Do
not invade or attack Taiwan!" or "Do not interfere in China's internal
affairs!" It is self-evident that these and similar acts of communication
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97, 98 (1963), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN
POLICY 359, 360 (James N. Rosenau ed., 1969) ("Deterrence fails when the attacker de-
cides that the defender's threat is not likely to be fulfilled."); Richard Wasserstrom, War,
Nuclear War, and Nuclear Deterrence: Some Conceptual and Moral Issues, 95 ETHICS 424,
424 (1985), reprinted in NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: ETHICS AND STRATEGY 15 (Russell
Hardin et al. eds., 1985) ("One cannot think adequately about the moral issues of nuclear
deterrence without thinking about the moral issues of nuclear war.").
5. S. Con. Res. 43, 104th Cong. (1996); see also infra note 22; infra text accompany-
ing note 90.
6. Examples abound: Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng indirectly warned the United
States to stay out of the Strait in a speech before the National People's Congress, see infra
note 143 and accompanying text; various U.S. officials remarked on the grave conse-
quences attacks on Taiwan would have, see infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text; the
Chinese recalled high-level emissaries and expelled American military attach6s, see infra
notes 98, 102-03 and accompanying text; the United States and negotiated "routine" arms
transfers to Taiwan and downgraded the status of official meetings with China, see infra
notes 148, 152 and accompanying text; China arrested both Chinese and American human
rights activists, see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text; the United States announced
and carried out major ship movements, while China announced and conducted missile
"tests," staged mock invasions, and various other war games, see infra notes 132-40 and
accompanying text.
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occurred in the heat of the Strait crisis. What we want to know, however,
and what Question Three aims to discover is, at least in part, how such
communication works. In particular, we want to know how a person or a
state can 'say' one thing and mean it, but also mean something else,
something quite different, at the same time.
There is a great deal of information to absorb in the various fact and
theory intensive sections of this article, which places a heavier burden
than I would like on my audience. Therefore, I must with apologies beg
the reader to indulge me by retaining and integrating as much material as
possible in each successive section while the exposition of the whole un-
folds. My underlying assumption here is that if you do not understand
the factual and theoretical background of this empirical inquiry, you may
not fully understand or appreciate the questions I am posing or, more
importantly, the answers I am offering for them. Having said that, let me
point out that the Appendix is the most fact-intensive portion of the arti-
cle, and reviews in very concise terms the ten-month period preceding
the crisis. This portion, together with accompanying footnotes, resem-
bles a politico-diplomatic narrative which may have special appeal for
historians, and is probably essential background for all but those who re-
call the basic sequence of events from May 1995 to March 1996 with rea-
sonable clarity. In any event, I will assume familiarity with it throughout
the rest of the paper. Section I1 discusses some conceptual and historical
roots of the notion of strategic deterrence, while Section III examines the
legal status of U.S. actions in the Strait under: (a) the Taiwan Relations
Act of 1979; and (b) international law and norms constraining the use of
force against sovereign states. Finally, Section IV, which will be unfa-
miliar to most readers, embodies a novel application of some logico-
analytical tools to specific examples of the signaling behavior involved in
this particular deterrence situation, and ultimately demonstrates how
that signaling behavior bears upon the interpretation of relevant law. It
is my contention that the tools used here can be broadly applied to ex-
plain much of this and similar behavior exhibited by the United States
and China, as well as comparable behavior of other parties in similar cri-
ses.
II. ROOTS OF DETERRENCE
Non-nuclear deterrence, deterrence as such, is an old strategy in war-
fare,7 and arguably a fundamental concept in the social life of human
7. See GEORGE & SMOKE, supra, note 4, at 11-37 (tracing the historical develop-
ment of deterrence theory from the Peloponnesian War to the post-World War II era).
[Vol. 47:51
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beings. It did not arrive pn the scene with nuclear weapons technology
and will not vanish with the end of the Cold War or waning concerns
about the prospect of large-scale nuclear combat. In this respect, the
root concept of deterrence, broadly construed, is very much alive and a
sometimes conspicuous feature of human behavior and decision making
by state and non-state actors, in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere. In the
most elementary terms, how does it work?
At the physical level, states, like private individuals, can and do resolve
differences through force. Given superior physical strength in the proper
configuration, one state can simply take what it wants from another or
prevent another from taking what it has. Strength, of course, is not sim-
ply a brute numerical calculation, but rather is derived from quality as
well as quantity, from superior organization and deployment of force, as
well as the possession of numerically greater human and material assets.
At a more abstract level, strength can also be derived from economic and
political power. Other things being equal, strong states can thus over-
whelm weak ones. However, the Taiwan Strait standoff, while it was
very much concerned with strength, was primarily about something else:
deterrence. Deterrence typically depends upon, but goes beyond,
strength. It adds another level of complexity to physical conflict, re-
gardless of how well-equipped sophisticated belligerents may be in physi-
cal, economic, and political resources. Why is that?
What distinguishes deterrence from brute forms of combat is that de-
terrence operates at the physical and the mental level. It accomplishes
this by inspiring fear or intimidation by way of a threat of retaliation.
The state possessing the power to deter can prevent an adversary from
engaging in an action not to the state's liking. For example, it can keep
the adversary from destroying property, interrupting commerce, or
harming citizens, simply by threatening to use significant force if a for-
bidden act is undertaken.8 In this respect, the threat itself-the threat to
use significant force-becomes the chief weapon of deterrence. The de-
8. Deterrence also can broadly shape behavior. Beyond simply deterring an adver-
sary from bringing about untoward actions, a state can motivate the cessation of such ac-
tions after they are already underway; in this way, one might stop the arrest of civilians,
the looting of shrines, the use of "inhumane" explosives or the invasion of third parties. In
such cases, deterrence is used in a "negative" manner to terminate behavior. Conversely,
the power of deterrence can be used positively to motivate one's adversary to initiate or
take a particular action. For example, one may want the enemy not merely to hang fire
but to quit the fortress; not merely to halt the advance but to withdraw from territory al-
ready secured; and not merely to cease the torturing of prisoners but to release them. Just
as "negative" deterrent power can bring to an end an enemy's undesirable deeds, "posi-
tive" deterrent power can coerce the enemy into "undoing" deeds or initiating such new
deeds as the threatener may require.
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terring state communicates to its opponent-and it is precisely these acts
of communication which are our main concern in this article-that if the
opponent fails to behave in a particular fashion, an unwanted and per-
haps violent consequence will result. A country that is strong enough
and skilled enough vis-A-vis its adversary can in these ways deter that ad-
versary, and thereby control that adversary's actions through the sheer
power of this kind of intimidation. The deterred or coerced party fears
for its security and the loss or pain it will suffer if the threat is made good
and some substantial cost or the great fury of some potential violence is
unleashed against it. When deterrence of this kind succeeds, it typically
does so because the deterred party believes that his autonomous posi-
tion, or some element of it-his weapons, comrades-in-arms, industrial
assets, home, family, prosperity, perhaps his way of life or just his life
simpliciter-is worth more to him than the gains he might enjoy by un-
dertaking the challenged behavior. In a certain straightforward sense,
the deterred party's desire to maintain the status quo outweighs the de-
sire to take action and risk the unacceptably severe damage of retalia-
tion. 9
While this central role of the threat-of threatened rather than actual
violence-may well have been a factor in pre-historic and other pre-
modern conflicts, it came to the center of the strategic stage at the dawn
of the nuclear age, when the threatened use of nuclear weapons virtually
guaranteed wholly undesirable consequences for all parties. This single
attribute made nuclear deterrence conspicuous, perhaps unique, among
deterrence situations. In fact, the formal doctrine most commonly asso-
ciated with the expression "deterrence" in the context of international
affairs is essentially a product of the strategic thinking of the post-World
War II era, dating from the outset of the Cold War.' Strategic deter-
9. The assumption is that the adversary makes a kind of cost-benefit calculation of
the stakes. In this article, I am not concerned with addressing the question of whether
such calculations are actually made or how, but rather with the logic of the system through
which the deterring state communicates to its opponent that if the opponent fails to be-
have in a particular fashion, an unwanted and perhaps violent consequent will result.
Formal attempts to characterize the "post-communication" stakes involved in such calcu-
lations from a deterrence perspective might reason as follows: a Chinese attack can be de-
terred if China calculates that the expected costs and risks (or expected negative utilities)
of mounting the attack outweigh the expected benefits (or expected positive utilities).
Thus, Costs plus Risks exceed Benefits, or C + R > B. For example, China might conclude
this if it believed that the United States would come to the military defense of Taiwan or
impose costly economic sanctions on China in response to a Chinese attack on Taiwan.
10. The doctrine proper recognized that the great value of nuclear weapons was de-
pendent upon their destructive potential-the potential to inflict unacceptably severe
damage upon specific adversaries-and recognized, too, that this potential meant that nu-
clear weapons had other important uses besides the simple destruction of enemy assets or
[Vol. 47:51
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rence thinking has primarily concerned itself with nuclear weapons and
strategic questions about possible world wars in a nuclear-capable age."
Furthermore, until recently it primarily concerned the interests of two
nuclear superpowers-the United States and the former Soviet Union-
in deterring each other from using nuclear weapons, and only
peripherally concerned the affairs of third parties or client states.
However, the concerns of U.S. and Chinese decision makers from May
1995 to March 1996 were quite different. Formal doctrines of nuclear de-
terrence, like nuclear weapons themselves, probably did not figure di-
rectly, if at all, in the geo-political decision making of Washington or
Beijing during the 1996 crisis. Rather, this Taiwan Strait conflict con-
cerned non-nuclear deterrence. 2 While the United States and China are
both nuclear powers-even if very unevenly matched ones-and each
doubtless has, and had in the Strait, contingency plans for using nuclear
weapons against the other, this crisis was primarily about the welfare of a
third party: Taiwan. More precisely, it was about the U.S. interest in de-
terring Chinese aggression against Taiwan. 13
In such third party circumstances, if I seek to deter you, I do so not be-
cause you threaten or violate me or my homeland, but because you
threaten or violate another party whose welfare concerns me. I am will-
ing to expend the lives of my people and the treasure of my country to
troops. More importantly, however, the threat potential of these weapons gave them
value as levers and chips in negotiation. So enormous was that value that the doctrine
took as its central proposition the premise that the chief worth of the arms was in their
bargaining potential and not their use. As Bernard Brodie wrote in the locus classicus of
deterrence theory:
Thus, the first and most vital step in any American security program for the
age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of at-
tack the possibility of retaliation in kind. The writer in making that statement is
not for the moment concerned about who will win the next war in which atomic
bombs are used. Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has
been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can
have almost no other useful purpose.
Brodie, Implications for Military Policy, supra note 4, at 76.
11. See supra note 4 (listing sources examining nuclear strategy and deterrence).
12. Nuclear weapons did loom large in the background during earlier Strait crises
following World War II, particularly the crisis that developed in 1950 when North Korea
invaded South Korea. See infra text following note 120 (surveying briefly three earlier
Strait crises).
13. See HSIAO-SHIH CHENG, PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND TAIWAN (1990) (discussing the current state and future plans
of the Chinese military); Ray Montaperto, China as a Military Power, 56 INSS STRATEGIC
FORUM 1 (Dec. 1995) <http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum56.html>; David
Shambaugh, China's Military in Transition: Politics Professionalism, Procurement and
Power Projection, 146 CHINA Q. 265 (1996); see also Patrick E. Tyler, China's Military
Stumbles Even as Its Power Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1996, at Al.
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defend another, in some sense alien, tribe from your aggression. In such
circumstances, it is one thing to inform and convince a prospective ag-
gressor that I can and will defend my home from his assault and that,
come what may, the aggressor will suffer just for trying to intrude. It is
quite another matter to inform and convince an aggressor that I will go to
such trouble for someone else. How do I do these things?
First, in the theoretically successful case, the signaled threat will be
credible insofar as it is made by a threatener who is perceived by the ad-
versary as having the capability and the will to execute the threat. Sec-
ond, the threat must be expressed or communicated to an opponent
through some kind of signaling device-for example, a remark in a con-
versation, a letter or published statement, or the movement of military
assets or a demonstration of military power. Third, the opponent must
both receive and correctly understand the signal sent. Finally, the oppo-
nent must produce, at least in part as a result of receiving the threat, the
behavior desired by the would-be deterrer. On occasion, there may be
ancillary effects of making and successfully communicating the threat.
For example, one's allies may be reassured by the issuance of the threat,
one's enemies may be appropriately concerned that they may be the tar-
get of the threat in the future, or one's constituents may see one as
strong-just for having made the threats-or, in the alternative, as trig-
ger-happy, and so on. These are the roots of the phenomenon of third
party deterrence that faced Washington, Beijing, and Taipei in March
1996. What are the relations between these roots and the narrower do-
mestic and international law issues at the center of the crisis?
III. QUESTIONS OF LAW
This section presents answers to Questions One and Two posed in the
introduction. Part (A) explores the legality of military and non-military
U.S. actions in the Strait crisis under relevant statutory provisions of U.S.
law, while Part (B) assesses the legality of those actions under interna-
tional law and international norms prohibiting the use of force.
A. The Taiwan Relations Act
For almost two decades, America's relations with Taiwan have been
nominally governed by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which was en-
acted in 1979 as the mechanism through which the United States was to
"downgrade" its relationship with Taiwan to "unofficial" status, while of-
ficially recognizing and establishing full diplomatic relations with the
[Vol. 47:51
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People's Republic of China." In assessing U.S. actions in the 1996 crisis,
one might reasonably ask, first, whether the actions were permitted un-
der the terms of the TRA, and, second, whether the United States, in
carrying out those actions, fully met its obligations under the TRA. A
look at the history of the legislation demonstrates why these concerns are
of special importance.
In the course of normalizing relations with China in 1978, the United
States announced the termination of its mutual defense treaty with Tai-
wan." The congressional controversy over the Carter administration's
termination of the treaty, however, was so fierce that it motivated some
members of Congress to mount a constitutional challenge to the propri-
ety of the termination by the executive branch.16 While the challenge
14. See Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), §§ 2-17,22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 (1994). On the
U.S.-Taiwan "downgrading" or "derecognition" process, see GERHARD VON GLAHN,
LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 82 (7th
ed. 1996); see also BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
471-72 (2d ed. 1995) (reprinting provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act governing interna-
tional agreements and the American Institute of Taiwan).
15. Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, U.S.-P.R.C., 6 U.S.T. 433 (entered into
force Mar. 3, 1955, terminated Jan. 1, 1979). For the U.S. announcement accompanying
signing of the U.S.-P.R.C. Communiqu6 on Normalization, see Statement Issued by the
U.S. Gov't (Dec. 15, 1978), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY: BASIC DOCUMENTS 1977-80, Doc. No. 508, at 968 (1983); see also Joint Commu-
niqu6 of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, Aug. 17, 1982,
U.S.-P.R.C., 21 I.L.M. 1147, 1148 (1982) [hereinafter Taiwan Communiqud] (stating that
the United States would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan); Joint Communiqu6 on
the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China, Dec. 15, 1978, U.S.-P.R.C., § 6 , DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1979,
at 25 (establishing formal relations between the United States and the People's Republic
of China); United States-People's Republic of China: Joint Communiqu6, Feb. 28, 1972,
U.S.-P.R.C., 11 I.L.M. 443, 445 (1972) (noting that the People's Republic of China viewed
"[t]he Taiwan question [as] the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations
between China and the United States"). For a discussion of various practical and legal
dilemmas concerning U.S.-P.R.C. normalization in relation to Taiwan, see Hungdah Chiu,
Normalization and Some Practical and Legal Problems Concerning Taiwan, 2
OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES:
NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: PROBLEMS,
ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTS 51-71 (Hungdah Chiu ed., 1978).
16. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (arguing that the dispute between President Carter and various members of Con-
gress concerning the President's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan
was "not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting
its constitutional authority"). For a useful summary of the procedural history of the case,
see David I. Salem & Howard Jack Price, Jr., Note: Presidential Power to Terminate Trea-
ties without Congressional Action, Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 535 (1979),
OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES: THE
CHINESE CONNECTION AND NORMALIZATION 68-72 (Hungdah Chiu & Karen Murphy
eds., 1980).
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failed, it generated sufficient support in Congress to include provisions in
the TRA that effectively authorized a unilateral U.S. commitment to
Taiwan's defense, a commitment which essentially duplicated the one
scrapped when the United States normalized relations with the People's
Republic of China.'
7
The TRA is organized around three chief concerns: commercial activi-
ties, human rights, and security. The 1996 crisis can be characterized
most naturally under the rubric of security, and in that respect it should
be noted that four statements in section 2(b) of the Act emphasize U.S.
interests in maintaining peace, stability, and security in the Western Pa-
cific, and in ensuring that Taiwan's future is secured by peaceful means."
Another section provides that the United States will "provide Taiwan
with arms of a defensive character," and is implemented in section 3 of
the Act which provides that the United States "will make available to
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may
be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capa-
bility."' 9 As stated by Professor Lori Damrosch:
Just as important as arms sales to Taiwan is the TRA's explicit
commitment to maintain the capacity of the U.S. to resist any
resort to force or coercion that would jeopardize Taiwan's secu-
rity. As a statement of a political commitment adopted by the
Congress, this policy is probably at least as effective as the mu-
tual defense treaty that was in effect prior to the change in rec-
ognition.
To the extent that American military conduct, diplomatic actions, and
public policy statements during the crisis itself were designed to deter
Chinese military action against Taiwan, they would appear to have
17. See supra note 14 (citing the Taiwan Relations Act). On the first decade of the
Taiwan Relations Act, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Taiwan Relations Act After Ten
Years, 3 J. CHINESE L. 157 (1989); see also A. DOAK BARNETT, U.S. ARMS SALES: THE
CHINA-TAIWAN TANGLE (1982); CHINA AND THE TAIWAN ISSUE (Hungdah Chiu ed.,
1979); EDWIN K. SNYDER ET AL., THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AND THE DEFENSE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1980); A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP: THE UNITED STATES AND
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA UNDER THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT (Ramon H. Myers ed.,
1989); Tao-tai Hsia, The P.R.C.'s Attitude Toward the Taiwan Relations Act, in CHINA
POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 195-97 (Frederick Tse-shyang Chen ed., 1984); Lester
Wolff, The Legislative Intent of the Taiwan Relations Act, in CHINA POL'Y AND NAT'L
SECURITY 190-94 (Frederick Tse-shyang Chen ed., 1984).
18. See Taiwan Relations Act, § 2(b)(2)-(4), (6), 22 U.S.C. § 3301(b)(2)-(4), (6)
(1994).
19. Id. §§ 2(b)(5), 3(a); see also International Security Assistance Act of 1979, § 23(a),
22 U.S.C. § 3302 (1994) (authorizing the President "to transfer to Taiwan United States
war reserve material").
20. Damrosch, supra note 17, at 170 (footnote omitted).
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served section 2(b)'s interests in maintaining peace, stability, and security
in the Western Pacific and in ensuring that Taiwan's future was secured
by peaceful means. In addition, the arms transfer negotiated by the
United States and Taiwan during the crisis arguably falls within the scope
of the U.S. obligation under section 3 to make appropriate defensive
arms available to Taiwan.1 More importantly, it is likely, given the evi-
dent Congressional intent behind the language of section 2(b), that actual
U.S. intervention in the crisis would have been authorized under U.S.
law.
Of course, there was no actual U.S. intervention.22 Instead, there was
"observation" by U.S. military forces, albeit at relatively close range, of
23China's war games. I want to suggest, and ultimately elaborate upon,
what is perhaps obvious: that this was essentially constructive interven-
tion, intervention by indirect action and implied threat, which served the
purpose of deterrence. United States action (or some rough alternative)
was not only clearly permitted within the meaning of the TRA, but was
arguably required by the TRA in order to ensure that Taiwan's future
was secured by peaceful means. The failure to take such action could
well have exposed the United States to claims that it had neglected its
duty to ensure against any attempt to take Taiwan by force, particularly
if the Chinese had indulged in more belligerent behavior or actually at-
tacked or invaded. I shall return in due course to the subject of what the
21. A key provision of the 1982 U.S.-P.R.C. Joint Communiqu6 on Taiwan states:
[The United States] does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to
Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it in-
tends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan.
Taiwan Communiqud, supra note 15, § 6. This provision has been quite controversial for
conservative Republicans in the United States who regard it as undermining the U.S. secu-
rity commitment to Taiwan expressed in the TRA. See generally supra text accompanying
notes 18-19 (discussing the provisions of the TRA covering the commitment to the secu-
rity of Taiwan). It has also been controversial for the People's Republic of China, which
has bristled at continuing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan which, depending on one's assump-
tions, might be seen to violate section 6 of the Taiwan Communiqu6. Not surprisingly, the
Chinese viewed U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan during the 1996 crisis as violations.
22. At the height of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, however, a non-binding Resolution
was passed in the House of Representatives calling for U.S. assistance in the defense of
Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. See H.R. Con. Res. 140, 104th Cong. (1996) (en-
acted). This Resolution, along with a related Senate Resolution, see S. Con. Res. 43, 104th
Cong. (1996) (enacted), are discussed further below. See infra text accompanying notes
146, 148.
23. The public record indicates that the U.S.S. Independence aircraft carrier battle
group was stationed fewer than 200 miles east of Taiwan. See infra note 136 and accom-
panying text (concerning U.S. carrier force movements).
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TRA required in this regard, and how those requirements might be de-
termined. In this connection, I shall demonstrate that the indirect meth-
ods used by the United States effectively constrained interpretation of
the TRA and, as a result, partly shaped those requirements. Whether the
various American actions actually taken also fell within the bounds of in-
ternational law, given Taiwan's uncertain international status, is a much
stickier question to which I now turn.
B. Intervention and International Law
This section presents an answer to the second question posed in the in-
troduction by exploring the legality under international law of American
military and other actions in the Taiwan Strait crisis. In that regard, I
shall be concerned with unilateral intervention, that is, action taken by a
single state to project its power into the "internal" or "domestic" affairs
of another state or political entity.24 This type of action has traditionally
been prohibited under the norms of customary international law. As
characterized by Oppenheim, for example, this type of intervention is
seen as "dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another
state."25 The norm for international intervention is expressed in the prin-
ciples inherent in the modern international system of sovereign states,
such as the nonuse of force, political independence of states, and sover-
eign equality. This norm is given written expression in the U.N. Charter,
and other international documents, which I shall discuss in due course.26
24. On collective, as opposed to unilateral, intervention, see generally Tom J. Farer,
A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 316-47 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
25. L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 134, at 305 (H. Lauter-
pacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); see also 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 128, at 428
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) ("That intervention is, as a rule, for-
bidden by international law there is no doubt."). In recent times, these "state system" val-
ues have been balanced by a contrasting, and sometimes conflicting, set of "human rights"
values such as rights to due process, equality under law, and participation in deliberative
democracy. See id. § 131, at 439-45. In theory, "human rights" values can be used to jus-
tify intervention just as "state system" values can be used to justify non-intervention. See
id. at 442 & n.18. For an excellent discussion of this general topic see Lori Fisler Dam-
rosch, Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law, in EMERGING NORMS
OF JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION 96-100 (Laura W. Reed & Carl Kaysen eds., 1993). In this
article, I will not take up the question of whether, and if so, how U.S. action in the Strait
could have been justified under international law norms using a "human rights" model.
On this topic, however, it is worth noting that section 2(c) of the TRA is devoted in part to
expressing a U.S. commitment to the "preservation and enhancement of the human rights
of all the people of Taiwan." Taiwan Relations Act, § 2(c), 22 U.S.C. § 3301(c) (1994).
26. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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What kinds of conduct count as intervention? In international law, the
concept of intervention is broadly construed as consisting of any type of
interference in the affairs of another state, ranging from, for example,
offshore naval presence and exercises to naval blockade or direct internal
military action; from economic coercion to arms supply for guerrillas;
from financial aid to diplomatic recognition of secessionists. Interven
tion of any type is invariably aimed at one end: forcing a target state to
take some action desired by the intervening state, and is premised on the
assumption that the target state would not otherwise be inclined to take
that action." Such intervening behavior risks exposing the intervenor to
the charge of violating international law by interfering in the sovereign
affairs of the target state. Where a state has already intervened "ille-
gally," subsequent intervention by yet another state-which is often justi-
fied as an attempt to undo the earlier illegal intervention-is called coun-
29ter-intervention.
Many of these elements of "interference"-naval presence and dem-
onstration, arms supply, intervention, and counter-intervention-were, in• • 30
one way, or another, present in the Taiwan Strait crisis. It is our task to
sort out some of the reasons for this messy tangle. To do this, we must
see what made the crisis unusually complex as a matter of international
law. Let us begin by providing a taxonomy of conflicts featuring unilat-
27. See PETER CALVOCORESSI, WORLD ORDER AND NEW STATES: PROBLEMS OF
KEEPING THE PEACE 17 (1962); LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
111-24 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.,. 1991); R.J. VINCENT,
NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 13 (1974); Damrosch, supra note 25,
at 91-110; Rosalyn Higgins, Intervention and International Law, in INTERVENTION IN
WORLD POLITICS 30 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984). See generally Max Beloff, Reflections On
Intervention, 22 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 198 (1968) (discussing the history and theories of inter-
vention); Hans J. Morgenthau, To Intervene or Not to Intervene, 45 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 425
(1967) (same).
28. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans.
& eds., 1976); Stanley Hoffman, The Problem Of Intervention, in INTERVENTION IN
WORLD POLITICS 9 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984).
29. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 572 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing
winter-intervention with respect to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan); MICHAEL
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 90 (1977) (discussing the concept of counter-intervention).
30. There was a question whether China would undertake, or was in effect already
undertaking, a blockade of Taiwan, because its forces seemed incapable of logistically
managing an invasion, and its leadership was likely unwilling--even without U.S. involve-
ment-to suffer the casualties and inflict the damage that would have accompanied any
invasion. See Edward A. Gargan, Chinese, In A Move To Alarm Taiwan, Fire Test Mis-
siles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at Al; Patrick E. Tyler, War Games Off Taiwan To Ex-
pand, Beijing Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at 12. A blockade would have been illegal
under international law, where Taiwan was regarded as a sovereign state. See supra notes
24-26 and accompanying text (considering international norms of intervention).
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eral intervention. The first type of conflict simply involves the use of
armed force by one sovereign state against another-this may be de-
scribed as inter-state conflict. The second type, demonstrated by the
Strait crisis, involves a third party's extension of assistance to one of the
parties involved in a distinctly two-party conflict. These situations come
in two variants: one in which the core two-party conflict is an inter-state
conflict, and one in which the two-party conflict is a non-inter-state con-
flict involving, for example, two intrastate parties, a state and a non-state,
or perhaps two non-states. Non-states are typically guerrilla, insurgent,
or terrorist groups. The intervention can take place in a variety of ven-
ues, for example, on territory controlled by one of the two parties-state
or non-state-involved in the core conflict, on territory controlled by a
political entity not otherwise involved, or in international waters or air-
space. Sometimes the third party intervention will be provided under the
auspices of a statute or treaty or defense pact, such as the TRA, and that
intervention can theoretically occur whether the core conflict is state-to-
state, state-to-non-state, or non-state-to-non-state in character.3'
What makes the U.S. intervention in the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis
somewhat difficult to characterize, and somewhat problematic under in-
ternational law, is the ambiguous status of Taiwan. Is Taiwan properly
characterized as a state or a non-state? Are its leaders guerrillas or in-
surgents, or terrorists? Or are they-after the elections of December
1995 and March 1996-now the duly elected officials of a sovereign po-
litical entity? The answers to these and related questions are not entirely
clear.
The ambiguous status of Taiwan is at least partly rooted in the victori-
ous Allied Powers' plans during and following World War II. The Allies
intended to restore to China various territories, including Taiwan, or
Formosa as it was then known, which had been occupied by Japan during
and prior to the war, and expressed this intention in the Cairo Declara-
32tion of 1943, and later confirmed it in the Potsdam Conference of 1945.
31. See INGRID DETTER DE LuPis, THE LAW OF WAR 61-71 (1987) (categorizing
and explaining various types and characteristics of intervention).
32. The Cairo Conference included President Franklin Roosevelt, representing the
United States, Winston Churchill, representing Great Britain, and Chiang Kai-shek, repre-
senting China. The three leaders expressed their decision to re-conquer and restore Ja-
pan's seizures in the Pacific in The Cairo Declaration of November 1943. See HERBERT
FEIS, CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT, STALIN: THE WAR THEY WAGED AND THE PEACE
THEY SOUGHT 252 (2d ed. 1967); REDVERS OPIE ET AL., THE SEARCH FOR PEACE
SETTLEMENTS 40 (1951); KEITH SAINSBURY, THE TURNING POINT: ROOSEVELT,
STALIN, CHURCHILL, AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1943-THE MOSCOW, CAIRO, AND
TEHERAN CONFERENCES 321-22 (1985) (containing the Cairo and Teheran Documents);
JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 474 (1990). The Potsdam
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When Japan finally collapsed in 1945, Formosa was already occupied by
Chinese forces; however, the Peace Treaty in which the Japanese for-
mally renounced control over the territory was not signed until 1951, and
did not take effect until 1952."3 By then, the Communists had seized the
mainland, while the Chinese Nationalists occupied only Formosa and a
handful of small offshore islands. Until the United States derecognized
Taiwan in the TRA, it viewed the Nationalist government as the sole le-
gitimate government of the whole of China and, thus, the effect of the
Peace Treaty with Japan was to place sovereignty over Formosa squarely
with the Nationalists. The communist perspective, however, was that
Formosa became an inalienable part of China proper from the moment
Japanese military units surrendered to Chinese forces in 1945, and that
sovereignty over all Chinese territory passed to the communist govern-
34ment when the Nationalists fled the mainland in 1949. It is on this com-
plex foundation that the terms of the TRA rest.
From the point of view of the mainland, Taiwan is purely and simply a
renegade mainland province, no different conceptually and geographi-
cally than the (non-renegade) province of Hainan Island off China's
southeast coast. Based on this view, the core conflict is internal to a sin-
gle sovereign state, the People's Republic of China, and pits the ruling
communist regime against Taiwanese insurgents. Therefore, the United
States must be given the status of an external third-party intervenor pro-
viding support for the insurgents and, perhaps, working to destabilize the
Beijing government. However, from the perspective of Taiwan and a
number of other sovereign states, including the United States to some
degree, Taiwan arguably has the de facto status of a sovereign state and
is simply being menaced by another; from this realpolitik angle the core
conflict has the character of a state-to-state dispute. As Professor Oscar
Schacter noted, "recognized governments have a right to receive external
military assistance and outside states are free to furnish such aid."3 On
Conference included President Harry Truman, representing the United States, Joseph
Stalin, representing Russia, and Winston Churchill, representing Great Britain, who was
replaced late in the Conference by Clement Atlee. See WILLIAM L. TUNG, CHINA AND
THE FOREIGN POWERS: THE IMPACT OF AND REACTION TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 269
(1970).
33. See Peace Treaty, Sept. 8,1951, Allied Powers-Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 2490,16 I.L.M.
1570 (1977) (entered into force April 28, 1952, ratification deposited Bolivia, August 11,
1977).
34. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-69 (2d ed.
1973) (discussing the status of Formosa after 1949); D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW
176-77 (2d ed. 1976) (same); LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 300-01 (3d ed. 1993) (same).
35. Oscar Schacter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1645 (1984). De facto sovereign status and external aid are the root of Beijing's concern
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this view, the United States was acting in the Strait crisis simply as an
outside state providing support for such a "recognized" government.
The one clear exception to the aiding-a-recognized-government rule
arises in the form of state-to-non-state conflict known as civil war, which
did besiege China at least until the Nationalists fled to Taiwan in 1949.
So the operative question, in one respect, is whether forty-eight years af-
ter Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan from the communist takeover on the
mainland, China and Taiwan are still involved in a civil war. From the
perspective of Beijing, the answer is "Yes," but from that of Taipei and
Washington, it is surely "No."36 This is true even though the United
States "downgraded" its relations with Taiwan when it normalized rela-
tions with the mainland in 1978 and recognized, under the so-called "one
China" policy, the Beijing government as the sole government of China.
As indicated in the foregoing discussion of the TRA, U.S. ability under
domestic law to provide defensive support for Taiwan was and is the up-
shot of the bolstered provisions of the TRA, providing another source of
Taiwan's unusual status under international law. By virtue of the TRA,
the United States recognizes Taiwan as part of China, but at the same
time acknowledges Taiwan's right to be free from any attempt by the
mainland to incorporate it by force of arms and undertakes an obligation
to assist in Taiwan's defense to ensure against the possibility of force.
Thus, as the United States views the situation, Taiwan has important at-
tributes which, for practical purposes, make it indistinguishable from a
sovereign state. Indeed, the U.S. decision to treat Taiwan as a state sov-
ereign in many legal matters is clearly stated in the TRA. For example,
section 4(a) of the TRA states that for the purpose of interpreting U.S.
with interest in independence among the Taiwanese. While the government of President
Lee is widely recognized as the government of Taiwan, it is recognized by Beijing only as a
provincial Chinese government, and by about 30 other, mostly minor, sovereign states as a
legitimate government in charge of a sovereign entity. Subsequent to the 1996 crisis,
President Lee launched a plan to dismantle the official provincial government of Taiwan,
which to a considerable degree structurally paralleled and functionally duplicated the na-
tional government. Despite warnings from Beijing, the plan came to fruition in July 1997,
and was widely seen to symbolize a further step toward Taiwanese independence. See
Taiwan Ends Its Status as a Province of China, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1997, § 1, at 6.
36. Given the general absence of armed hostilities and the development of robust
trade links across the Strait since China's "opening to the outside world" in 1979, the claim
of an ongoing civil war is counter-intuitive at best. See infra notes 86-89 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the relationship between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China
prior to the 1996 Crisis). See generally TAIWAN IN WORLD AFFAIRS (Robert G. Sutter &
William R. Johnson eds., 1994); HSIN-HSING WU, BRIDGING THE STRAIT: TAIWAN,
CHINA, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR REUNIFICATION (1994).
37. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34 (discussing the post-World War I1 status
of Taiwan); see also CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 14, at 471-73 (discussing the TRA in
the context of Taiwan's unique status under international law).
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laws, the United States should treat Taiwan in the same way that it was
treated before derecognition. s Moreover, section 4(b)(1) states that
terms in U.S. laws which "refer or relate to foreign countries, nations,
states, governments, or similar entities," are to be construed as "ap-
ply[ing] with respect to Taiwan."39 Finally, section 4(c) of the Act also
states that:
For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United
States, the Congress approves continuation in force of all trea-
ties and other international agreements, including multilateral
conventions, entered into by the United States and the govern-
ing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as
the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force be-
tween them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated
in accordance with law.0
Therefore, the U.S. decision to recognize Taiwan as part of China,
while determining that Taiwan shall be essentially treated as a sovereign
state under U.S. law, and acknowledging an obligation to assist in Tai-
wan's defense against forcible annexation by the mainland, has made for
a remarkably anomalous situation. As a result, the 1996 Taiwan Strait
conflict does not map neatly onto international law principles governing
the use of force as expressed in the U.N. Charter and elsewhere.41
The difficulty is that, depending on one's assumptions as to Taiwanese
sovereignty-is it or is it not a sovereign state?-statutory language as
well as international law norms may be interpreted in different ways. For
example, the concepts associated with key expressions in the Charter
such as "force" and "threat of force" embrace "a wide range of possible
meanings," and "[tiheir application to diverse circumstances involves
choices as to these meanings and assessments of the behavior and inten-
tions of various actors., 42 In this regard, the differences of opinion that
result from attempts at interpretation are "not significantly different
from those that arise with respect to almost all general legal principles.,
43
Thus, depending upon whether one adopts Beijing's or Washington's
perspective, one will read relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter differ-
ently. To consider just two examples, different interpretations are possi-
ble of Article 2(4): "All members shall refrain in their international rela-
38. See Taiwan Relations Act, § 4(a), 22 U.S.C. § 3303(a) (1994).
39. Id. § 4(b)(1).
40. Id. § 4(c).
41. See HENKIN, supra note 34, at 884-85 (providing a brief overview of the relevant
provisions of the U.N. charter governing the use of force).
42. Schacter, supra note 35, at 1633.
43. Id.
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tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations"; and Article 1(1), [the United
Nations must] take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggres-
sion or other breaches of the peace." 4
The problem of interpretation here is not especially complex because it
turns almost entirely on whether Taiwan is treated as part of China or as
a sovereign or quasi-sovereign state. From Beijing's perspective, the ex-
pression "territorial integrity" in Article 2(4) may refer, in the China-
Taiwan context, to a Taiwan which is a part of China, and to a Beijing
government which can legitimately exercise control over both China and
Taiwan. Under this interpretation, U.S. military action in the Strait
could be reasonably construed as a "threat or use of force" against China
within the meaning of Article 2(4) or an act of "aggression" within the
meaning of Article 1(1). On the other hand, from Washington's perspec-
tive, or that of any state recognizing Taiwan as possessing the de facto or
de jure status of a sovereign, the expression "territorial integrity" in Ar-
ticle 2(4) may refer to a Taiwan which is not a part of China, and to a
Taipei government which actually exercises control over Taiwan. Under
this interpretation, China's belligerent actions might be properly con-
strued as violating Article 2(4) and be subject to action under Article
1(1). Further, U.S. conduct could be construed as lawful under both the
TRA and Article 2(4), and consistent with the "maintenance of peace"
objective of Article 1(1).
Other relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter,45 U.N. declarations,4
and other international documents expressing the international law norm
44. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; art. 1, para. 1, reprinted in LELAND M. GOODRICH
ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 676 (3d
ed. 1969); see also G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 2319th mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/9890 (1974) (containing the "Definition of Aggression" United Nations Resolution);
Report of the Special Committee Defining Aggression, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 19, U.N.
Doc. A/9619 (1974) (attempting to define aggression). For U.S. comments on the defini-
tion of "aggression," see Robert Rosenstock, Statement to the U.N. Special Committee on
the Question of Defining Aggression (Apr. 12, 1974), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., May,
1974, at 498.
45. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2; art. 2, para. 1; art. 2, para. 7; arts. 24, 34, 39 and
55, reprinted in GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 44, at 676-77, 681, 683, 684, 687. In the cita-
tions here and in the following two footnotes, I follow Professor Damrosch's discussion.
See Damrosch, supra note 25, at 98-106 & nn.9-10, 107 n.1l.
46. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 1883rd mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970), reprinted
in 13 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 337 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1976); Declaration on
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of non-intervention4 7 are also subject to precisely these same problems of
interpretation. For these reasons, even though neither the United States
nor China engaged in any overt act of war, many would see the threats
represented by both U.S. and Chinese actions as falling well within the
scope of what U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie called the "veiled
threat,, 48 and Professor Wolfgang Friedmann called "indirect aggres-
sion.,
49
IV. DETERRENCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
We have now answered Questions One and Two, and determined that
U.S. actions in the crisis can be reasonably characterized within the
meaning of the TRA as legal under U.S. law. In addition, I have found
that if one assumes de jure or something akin to de facto Taiwanese sov-
ereignty, U.S. actions can be reasonably characterized as legal under in-
ternational law, within the meaning of customary norms governing the
use of force among sovereign states as codified in the U.N. Charter and
other international law instruments. Conversely, these actions are ar-
guably illegal if such assumptions are not made.
With this rather unusual background of U.S. and international law, I
turn to a closely related but more daunting task. This section examines
some of the deterrence signaling and communication mechanisms at
work in the Strait crisis, and thus begins to answer Question Three posed
in the introduction. The theoretical approach I take in answering this
question has never been used before. It exploits contemporary technical
developments in the study of human communication and reasoning; spe-
cifically, research on the logic of natural languages within the framework
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1408 mtg.;
U.N. Doc. (1965), reprinted in 10 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 107 (Dusan J. Djono-
vich ed., 1974).
47. See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Questions Relating to
Security in Europe (Helsinki Accord) (Aug. 1, 1975), reprinted in 6 HUMAN RIGHTS,
EUROPEAN POLITICS, AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD: THE DOCUMENTARY EVOLUTION
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE 1973-1975, at 185
(Igor I. Kavas et al. eds., 1981); Organization of African Unity Charter (May 25, 1963),
reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963); Organization of American States Charter, art. 18 (Apr.
20, 1948), 2 U.S.T. 2416, 2420 (1952); Pact of League of Arab States, art. 8 (Mar. 22, 1945),
70 U.N.T.S. 237, 254 (1950); Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,
art. 8 (Dec. 26, 1933), 69 Stat. 3097, 3115 (1936).
48. The Question of Defining Aggression: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A/2211, at 52 (1952), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 894-96. Trygve Lie of
Norway served from 1946 to 1953.
49. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 262 (1964).
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of Anglo-American philosophy of language, linguistic pragmatics, and
allied disciplines. While the answer I provide to Question Three with the
help of this approach is by no means exhaustive, it will, I believe, pro-
duce for the reader an important new way of understanding some key
concepts in the machinery of deterrence-such as orders, threats, and
promises-as they are exhibited in the international signaling behavior of
governments engaged in martial conflict. More importantly, as I noted at
the outset of this study, the answer to Question Three is closely related
to the answer to Question One, largely because it shows how indirection
permitted the United States to bypass the chore-and sidestep the risk-
of clarifying the precise meaning of the TRA, and for that matter the
status of Taiwan under international law. In other words, the United
States never had to state just what the TRA required or what actions the
United States would initiate under what circumstances during the Strait
crisis.
A. The Structure of Signals: Orders, Threats, and Promises
From a technical point of view, the study of the logic of orders, threats,
and promises belongs to the branch of the philosophy of language known
as the theory of speech acts."' I shall argue that within the framework of
that theory, a communicative act designed to deter is a hybrid of two
types of act: the threat, which is similar to a promise, and the order." I
50. The literature on the subject of speech acts is extensive, and a comprehensive re-
view of it is beyond the space I have available in this article. See generally J.L. AUSTIN,
How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1962); JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND
MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS (1979) [hereinafter SEARLE,
EXPRESSION AND MEANING]; JOHN R. SEARLE & DANIEL VANDERVEKEN,
FOUNDATIONS OF ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC (1985); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN
ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969); J.L. Austin, Performative-Constative,
in PHILOSOPHY AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE 22 (Charles E. Caton ed., 1963); L. Jona-
than Cohen, Do Illocutionary Forces Exist? 14 PHIL. Q. 118 (1964); H.P. Grice, Utterer's
Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word Meaning, 4 FOUND. LANG. 225 (1968); John R.
Searle, A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, in 7 MINNESOTA STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SCIENCE: LANGUAGE, MIND AND KNOWLEDGE 344-69 (Keith Gunderson ed., 1975);
P.F. Strawson, Intention and Convention in Speech Acts, 73 PHIL. REV. 439 (1964). For
additional relevant citations, see infra notes 52, 53, 61, 76. Scholarship closely related to
the theory of speech acts may also be found in the literature of linguistic pragmatics and
other disciplines falling under the broad rubric of cognitive science. See generally RUTH
M. KEMPSON, PRESUPPOSITION AND THE DELIMITATION OF SEMANTICS (1975);
STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS 226-45 (1983); JOHN LYONS, SEMANTICS (1977);
SPEECH ACT THEORY AND PRAGMATICS (John R. Searle et al. eds., 1980); DAN
SPERI3ER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION
(1968); 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds.,
1975).
51. I do not claim that all scholars working on speech act theory or in pragmatics
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cannot in this space elaborate a full-blown account of this theory, how-
ever, for the sake of clarity I will review a few of its rudimentary distinc-
tions and assumptions.
According to the theory, speech acts are the basic unit of linguistic
communication among speakers of natural languages. Speakers of a
given language L communicate with each other in part by making utter-
ances in reliance on grammatical rules, principles, and other constraints
associated with L, which determine the meanings of words, sentences,
and utterances in L. Let us label this the essential condition, and note
that it will apply in both communicative and non-communicative con-
texts. Generally, in contexts of communication, when a speaker S per-
forms a speech act in L with the intention of communicating with an ad-
dressee or hearer H, S intends the performance of the speech act to
produce in H, by virtue of the essential condition, a certain response-
namely, an understanding of what S means by performing the speech act.
Furthermore, S intends that H recognize S's intention to produce that re-
sponse, and intends that H's recognition of S's intention to produce that
response will partly serve as a reason for H's response. This version of
the so-called communication-intention theory of meaning is derived from
the account originally formulated by Paul Grice.5 However, while I will
be discussing and analyzing communication situations in the Strait con-
flict, it is important to understand that the phenomenon of meaning in
the context of this article does not depend entirely, as it did in Grice's ac-
count, on communication intentions. Rather, I will adopt, even though I
cannot here discuss it in detail, the view first articulated by John Searle
and his followers that meaning intentions are intentions to represent, re-
gardless of whether or not a particular representation is used for com-
munication.53 Communication intentions, by contrast, are intentions to
communicate one's representing intentions. Thus, in the performance of
many speech acts there is a double level of intention, one at the level of
intentions to represent, another at the level of intentions to communi-
cate.
I want now to explicate some logical properties of a handful of speech
acts, which, in one way or another, played a role in the Strait crisis.
share a unified technical analysis of the properties of threats, promises, or orders. Fur-
thermore, while many linguistic researchers share various assumptions about the nature of
language, meaning, and communication, I am unaware of anyone who has proposed, or
would subscribe to, the type of deterrence analysis presented here.
52. See generally H.P. Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REV. 377 (1957).
53. See John R. Searle, Meaning, Communication and Representation, in
PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS OF RATIONALITY 209-26 (Richard E. Grandy & Richard
Warner eds., 1986).
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Along the way, I will be able to fill in some of the theoretical story about
how representing intentions and, in turn, communication intentions
work. It is widely understood that well-formed speech acts, produced by
S according to the grammatical rules and other constraints of L, will typi-
cally have a propositional content p and an illocutionary force. For ex-
ample, if one utters to one's interlocutor, "Cease directing bellicose ac-
tions at Taiwan," the propositional content is "that H not direct bellicose
actions at Taiwan" and the illocutionary force is that of an order. The
order will be carried out or obeyed if H performs the action A ordered
by S. Let us call this the propositional content condition on the speech
act. Moreover, in issuing such an order, S also always expresses an un-
derlying mental state. Typically, in the case of an order, the mental state
will be one of desire (or want or wish). Because the mental state is al-
ways expressed in the performance of the speech act, S cannot without
contradiction both issue the order that p, and at the same time deny
having the desire that p. S cannot say "I order you to cease directing
bellicose actions at Taiwan, but I do not want you to cease those ac-
tions.
,5 4
For any particular act, however, S can be insincere or attempt to mis-
lead H as to what S's actual desires are, but whether S does this or not
has no effect on the fact that in the performance of any given speech act
of ordering, S will always of necessity convey to H the desire that H do
A. Indeed, it is precisely this condition which makes insincerity, deceit,
and so on, possible. We can label the underlying mental state the sincer-
ity condition on the speech act of ordering. Finally, in the case of a well-
formed speech act of this kind, S can only order H to do what H has the
ability to do. If I order you to jump over the moon, but you are not able
to obey my order because you are not able to perform the action in ques-
tion, then my order is defective for lack of physical ability on your part.
Similarly, I can only order you to cease directing bellicose actions at Tai-
wan if you have the ability to cease such actions, and are in control of the
forces directing the actions. This can be labeled the preparatory condi-
tion on the speech act.
Just as the speech act has a propositional content, the mental state will
also have a content, which we can label a representative content. More
importantly, the representative content (that H not direct bellicose ac-
tions at Taiwan) will match exactly the propositional content of the
speech act. In those cases where H performs the action ordered (that is,
54. This phenomenon is generally known as Moore's Paradox, following the English
philosopher G.E. Moore.
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ceases the bellicose actions), not only will the speech act be obeyed, but
the underlying desire will likewise be satisfied. In general, the order will
be satisfied in part because H does A as a result of being ordered to do A
by S. By contrast, in those cases where H does A, but not in order to
satisfy S's order, or where H does A, but has no knowledge of the order
or would have performed A in any case, S's order may be only partly
satisfied or may perhaps go entirely unsatisfied. In these ways, both the
propositional content of the speech act, and the corresponding content of
the underlying mental state, will each represent their own satisfaction
conditions-that is, the conditions in the world under which the order
will be obeyed and the desire fulfilled.
In the present example, the speech act has the illocutionary force of an
order, but orders are part of a larger class of speech acts which we can
label Directives. This class includes among many others, not just orders,
but also commands, directions, exhortations, instructions, questions, en-
treaties, and requests. In the case of any speech act in this class, S is at-
tempting to get H to perform some action. In fact, the attempt to secure
the performance of the action is what defines the so-called illocutionary
point or purpose of the whole Directive class. In each case, S is trying to
get "the world to match the words." In general, all of the logical proper-
ties that I have just enumerated for orders will also be observed in the
operation of other speech acts in the Directive class.
It is also true that the same proposition can represent the content of
speech acts with various illocutionary forces, and I shall now look at a
couple of examples of speech acts with other forces to make the point.
First, consider that S can not only order H to cease its bellicose actions,
but can, for example, state that H has done so ("You have ceased your
bellicose actions."). In such a case, the illocutionary force is that of a
statement, even though the propositional content is, again, that H cease
its bellicose actions. Statements belong to the class of Assertives, whose
other members include, for example, assertions, predictions, reports, de-
scriptions, characterizations, and conclusions. The illocutionary point or
purpose of acts in this class is not, as in the case of Directives, to get H to
do A. Rather, it is to indicate that such and such is the case, or that the
world is thus and so. Therefore, in performing such an act, S is not trying
to get "the world to match the words," rather, S is trying to get "the
words to match the world."
In the case of statements, as with Directives, there is for each Assertive
an underlying mental state in a certain psychological mode, and the rep-
resentative content of the state exactly matches the propositional content
of the speech act. In general, the psychological mode for acts in this class
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will be belief, and the content of the state will represent its conditions of
satisfaction in the same way that the content of the statement represents
its satisfaction conditions. For acts in the Assertive class, however, con-
ditions are called truth conditions, and the acts and beliefs are assessed in
terms of truth and falsity according to whether they succeed or fail in
matching the world. Thus, the statement that H has ceased its bellicose
actions will be true or false, depending on whether H has ceased or not.
Likewise, the belief that H has ceased those actions will be a true belief if
H has in fact ceased, otherwise it will be false. Further, as in the case of
Directives, for acts in the Assertive class the underlying psychological
state, namely, belief, will also always be expressed in the performance of
the speech act so that S cannot, without contradiction, state and also
deny the belief that, for example, S has ceased directing bellicose actions
at Taiwan.
Let us also consider the case of promises. The proposition that a par-
ticular actor cease its bellicose actions can occur in promises just as it can
occur in orders and statements. This happens when, for example, S
promises that S will cease directing bellicose actions at Taiwan. In such a
case, the illocutionary force is that of a promise, and the propositional
content is that S will cease directing such actions. Promises belong to the
class of Commissives, some of whose other members are pledges, vows,
oaths, contracts, bequests, and undertakings. The illocutionary point or
purpose of acts in this class is not, as in the case of Directives, to get H to
do A, or, as in the case of Assertives, to state that such and such is the
case. Rather, it is to commit S to doing A, for example, to cease directing
bellicose actions at Taiwan. Thus, in performing this type of act, S is not
trying to get "the world to match the words" by getting someone else to
do something, or trying to get "the words to match the world" by saying
how things are. Rather, in the case of Commissives, S is trying to get
"the world to match the words," either by committing himself or herself
to doing something, to seeing to it that someone else does something, or
to seeing to it that something happens.
There is for each Commissive, as for each Directive and Assertive, an
underlying mental state in a certain psychological mode, and the repre-
sentative content of that state will exactly match the propositional con-
tent of the speech act. In general, the psychological mode for acts in the
Commissive class will be intention, and the content of the state will rep-
resent its conditions of satisfaction in the same way that the contents of
Directives and Orders represent their satisfaction conditions. For acts in
the Commissive class, we can call those conditions satisfaction conditions,
and we can assess the acts and underlying intentions in terms of whether
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S keeps the commitment (the promise, vow, oath, etc.) by conforming his
or her behavior in the world to match the words. Thus, S's promise to
cease its bellicose actions will be kept or broken depending on whether S
has actually done A or not. Likewise, the intention to do A will be actu-
ally executed if S has ceased directing its bellicose actions at Taiwan,
otherwise it will be unfulfilled. And where Directives always express de-
sires, and Assertives express underlying beliefs, so too do Commissives
express an underlying mental state: intention. Thus, S cannot both
promise to do A and deny the intention to do A without risking contra-
diction.
B. Signals in Deterrence
I now examine the role of signals in deterrence and turn my attention
to analyzing those signals in terms of the communicative acts of the par-
ties. I earlier suggested that the essence of deterrence consisted of a hy-
brid communicative act, which conjoined the order and the threat. I am
now in a position to demonstrate how that hybrid works.
The power of deterrence, at its core, is the power of one party to get a
second party to do something or forebear from doing something. In this
basic respect, deterrence has the structure of an order. As demonstrated
above, the illocutionary point of the order is to get H to do something,
namely, perform or refrain from performing the action expressed in the
propositional content of the order. This was illustrated when, for exam-
ple, the U.S. Senate urged China to "cease directing its bellicose actions
at Taiwan." And orders are quite sufficient if H, in fact, does A when S
performs the act of ordering.
However, in deterrence something more is needed or at any rate
added. Deterrence adds the further element of the threat to the order as
an aid to getting the order obeyed. This is what gives deterrence its con-
ditional form: if you do not do what I say, then I will unleash my forces
against, inflict pain upon, or exact a price from you and your interests.
On the other hand, if you do do as I say, then I will refrain from bringing
these costs to bear. We have seen that orders are a member of the Direc-
tive class, but where do threats fit in?
It is clear that whereas an order is about a future action or intentional
inaction by the agent at whom the order is directed, a threat is generally
about a future action by the agent who issues it. This suggests that the
threat is a member of the Commissive class. It is as regards its proposi-
tional content (that S do A) clearly akin to promises, vows, oaths, and the
like. However, curiously, there are at least two important differences be-
tween the threat and the paradigm of the Commissive class-the prom-
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ise. We can begin to get a grip on those differences by recalling that it is
sometimes said a threat is a promise to do something (bad) to you, not a
promise to do something (good) for you. The analysis in this folk psy-
chology is not completely explicit, but the intuition moves in the right di-
rection. What is the insight behind that intuition?
First, in the paradigm case, the action promised by the speaker is
something wanted by the hearer: when I promise to send my fleet to pro-
tect you or promise to sell you ordnance, I am usually committing myself
to performing a future action that you want me to perform. It is in this
sense that I am promising to do something (good) for you. This is not
true in the case of threats; indeed, the exact opposite is the case with
threats. When I threaten, for example, to withhold Most-Favored-
Nation trading privileges from you (as the United States appears to have
done to China during the crisis) or threaten military attack on your po-
litical process (as China appears to have done to Taiwan during the cri-
sis), the actions I threaten are things you very much do not want to see
happen. In this sense, I am promising to do something (bad) to you.
Second, a promise always contains a representation of future action
and a commitment to that action by virtue of the essential condition on
the performance of the act.55 If the institution of promising by way of
conventionalized formulas and other methods did not exist within L-
here I have in mind formulas such as "I promise to A" or "I will do A" or
"I am going to see to it that A; you have my word on it"-acts of
promising couldn't get off the ground. Again, this is not true in the case
of threats. Threats can be, but need not be, representational. The town
bully, for example, may intentionally threaten the community because he
somehow finds satisfaction in it,56 not because he conditions his actions
on others changing their behavior at his behest and needs some means of
representing and communicating this desire. Moreover, unlike
representations, persons and animals, and even plants and inanimate
things for that matter, can just be threatening. That is, something can
simply be threatening to some person or group without formally
representing any intention to harm or impose costs on the person or
group. One thinks of snakes and spiders, street gangs, and escaped
convicts. It should be noted that this fact is in significant part about the
perceptions and mental states of the threatened party, and not
55. Even the metaphorical use of promising, as in "She is a promising young violinist"
is about possible future action, despite a lack of formal commitment or any representation
uttered or otherwise generated by the "promisor."
56. The thrill, however, is not always a cheap one. Recent accounts about some bul-
lies being done in by fed-up neighbors have been widely circulated. See Bill Calahan, New
Trial is Sought for Killer of Neighbor, SAN DIEGO UNION -TRIB., Jan. 4, 1997, § B2, at 6.
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states of the threatened party, and not necessarily about the entity posing
the perceived threat at all.57 In these circumstances, the threatener does
not need to utter a representation or make a commitment to do A, or
"make good" on the threatened conduct or event. I am inclined to think
that this "subjective perception" concept is the root concept of the
threat, from which the more complex representational form at work in
deterrence conditionals was derived. This is the converse of the promise,
where the representational form is surely the root concept, since the
public commitment to future action is a necessary condition for any act
of promising.
However, while threatening conduct need not be representational or
entail a commitment, some does, and it is precisely this conduct which is
involved in deterrence. While the threat is surely of the Commissive
class, and the order is of the Directive, the two are conjoined in deter-
rence. First, I order that p: do as I say. And second, I vow, conditionally,
that if not p, then q: if you do not do as I say, then the potential force at
my disposal will be inflicted upon you. Now, as a first cut, we might ob-
serve that this conditional structure adequately depicts both deterrence
strategies in the Strait, specifically the bellicose actions of China toward
Taiwan, and the bellicose actions of the United States toward China.
China sought to convey and did convey to the Taiwanese electorate that
a Taiwanese show of electoral support for "independence" candidates
would bring about a belligerent response from Beijing, including perhaps
a missile attack or even an invasion. The United States sought to convey
and did convey to the Chinese leadership that further escalation of bel-
ligerent actions toward Taiwan could result in U.S. military and eco-
nomic action designed to protect Taiwan from military attack or other
18forms of serious aggression.
C. Indirection in Deterrence
I have now demonstrated how martial deterrence occurring in the
Strait and elsewhere typically has the conditional structure observed in
such fully explicit verbal expressions as "If you do X, I will not do Y," or
"If you fail to do X, I will do Y," or, in an alternative disjunctive syntax,
57. Severe snowstorms, floods, fires, earthquakes, unsafe airplanes, and coffee urns
also fit the bill, even if only metaphorically.
58. It is easy to see how this analysis fits the communication-intention model, at least
in a rough and ready way. The Chinese performed certain acts designed to threaten Tai-
wan, and did so in part by getting the Taiwanese to recognize the Chinese intention to
threaten Taiwan. Likewise, the United States performed certain acts designed to threaten
China and did so in part by getting China to recognize the U.S. intention to threaten
China.
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"Do X or I will do Y," and so on. However, many utterances designed to
convey these sorts of martial deterrence signals are not fully formed ex-
plicit verbal conditionals. That is, they achieve their intended function
even though they use fragmentary or indirect means of expressing the de-
terrence conditional. For example, in the Strait some signals were verbal
and direct, but still only stated part of the conditional. The Senate
Resolution, for example, urged China to "cease directing its bellicose ac-
tions at Taiwan," which explicitly expresses only the order, the first "Do
X" part of the conditional. Others were verbal and indirect-for exam-
ple, the assertion made by a number of American officials, in various
periphrastic equivalents, that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would have
"grave consequences," expressing neither the "Do X" of the order, nor
the "Or I will do Y" of the threat.
Still other acts were reported or announced verbally but were them-
selves essentially non-verbal, such as the "test" missile launches and war
games staged by the People's Liberation Army, and the dispatch of U.S.
warships to the Strait region. These were among the most striking events
of the crisis, perhaps because they came close to demonstrating the
harmful, costly conduct represented by the threat portion of the deter-
rence conditionals issued by both the United States and China. More-
over, they were highly conventional threat signaling devices, often used
in the conduct of "gunboat diplomacy" and its variants. Nonetheless,
these acts were at bottom indirect, as were many of the verbal communi-
cative acts of the crisis-there is nothing inherent in ship deployments,
missile tests, troop movements, and the like which necessarily connects
them with orders or threats. In the proper context, however, and con-
joined with the proper speech acts, they are firmly connected with orders
and threats. How is that? In this section, I want to determine whether
we can make sense of these various acts and events in terms of what we
know and what we can figure out about the use of indirection in the the-
ory of speech acts.
1. Verbal Indirection
We earlier stated that speakers of L rely on their knowledge of the
grammatical rules, constraints, and principles of L to determine the
meaning of utterances in L. This is the essential condition on utterances
in L. I must now refine the characterization of meaning in L somewhat.
First, it is well understood that the syntactical and semantic rules of L
will generally determine the meanings of words and sentences in L, apart
from any particular use to which those words and sentences might be put
by a speaker of L. There is, in a fairly uncontroversial sense, a set of re-
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liable "literal" meanings always available for a particular word or sen-
tence among a community of L speakers. The syntactical and semantic
rules of L will determine those meanings by determining a set of truth or
satisfaction conditions for words and sentences in L. Thus, for example,
my assertion that "John is opening the door" determines a fairly straight-
forward set of satisfaction conditions, according to which "John is open-
ing the door" is true if and only if John is in fact opening it. Further, as I
have demonstrated, where the illocutionary force of the speech act var-
ies, the satisfaction conditions so determined will correspondingly differ.
Thus, John's promise to open the door ("I promise to open the door")
will be satisfied if and only if John keeps his promise by opening the
door. John's report that he opened the door ("I opened it") will be satis-
fied if and only if John actually opened the door, and so on.
In some circumstances, however, the relevant meaning is not captured
by these methods. Take, for example, "Could you open the door?"
Here, the syntactical and semantic rules will determine that by virtue of
the meanings of its component parts, the utterance will be satisfied (the
question answered) if and only if the addressee indicates whether she
can, in fact, open the door by uttering, for example, "Yes, I can open it"
or "No, I cannot." This analysis of the satisfaction conditions, however,
would miss the point in one important class of cases, notably the class in
which "Could you open the door?" is not simply a question about H's
ability, but is rather a request that the door be opened. The literal inter-
pretation of the meaning of S's utterance-Does H have the ability to
open the door?-fails to capture what S meant, specifically, that he
wanted the door open and wanted H to open it. In this type of indirec-
tion, as in such other nonliteral meaning cases as irony, metaphor, hy-
perbole, sarcasm, parody, and so on, the divergence between word and
sentence meaning, on the one hand, and speaker meaning, on the other -is
easily observed. Word and sentence meaning concern such questions as
"What does sentence X mean?" or "What satisfaction conditions does X
determine?"; however, speaker meaning is quite different. It concerns
such questions as "What did Speaker S mean in uttering X?" or "How is
it that S could mean something by saying X?"
2. The Puzzle of Indirection
Thus, indirection presents a puzzle. The puzzle makes one wonder:
How is it that S can say one thing and mean that thing and something
else as well?" And how can H understand perfectly what S intends to say
59. In the typical case of indirection, S means both what is said (Are you able to open
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given that the sentence H hears is not, or not entirely, what S means?
The puzzle is made more complex by the fact that some expressions-for
example, "Could you open the door?"-have become standard formulas
for making indirect requests.
Very similar facts may be observed in the Strait crisis communications.
This was illustrated by the assertion so often publicly repeated by U.S.
officials: there would be grave consequences if China attacked Taiwan.
Clearly, in these cases S meant exactly what was said, "There will be
grave consequences," but also meant, and primarily meant, something
more, namely, "Do not attack Taiwan!" Yet, as with opening the door,
the Chinese interlocutors of these American officials likely had no diffi-
culty whatsoever in understanding what was meant in each instance.
I am going to make a very strong claim about the structural analogy
here: that some of the same general principles, rules, grammatical con-
straints, and interpretive strategies which appear to explain effectively
the workings of much of the indirection used in standard verbal commu-
nication also apply to indirect deterrence communications in the Strait.
Questions about ways in which the patterns of usage in the Strait vary
from conversational patterns-which strategies are adopted in the Strait,
which are ignored, and why-will be important questions to answer, and
I will try to make some headway on that project below. An equally
challenging puzzle is whether non-verbal communication in the Strait can
be explained by any of the same principles, rules, constraints, and strate-
gies. I will also try to examine this subject below. For the moment, I will
begin by looking more closely at mechanisms at work in ordinary conver-
sation.
3. Strategies in Conversation
In a straightforward way, the sentence uttered by S (Could you open
the door?) serves as the means by which S produces the desired effect in
H of understanding what S meant or intended (Open the door!). To see
how this works, let us adopt the terminology "secondary" illocutionary
act for the interrogative sentence S actually uttered (Could you open the
door?), and "primary" illocutionary act for the order S chiefly intended
to convey to H (Open the door!). 60 Thus, S performed the primary act by
means of performing the secondary act.
the door?) and something more (Open the door!). In other cases of non-literal meaning,
however, S will not necessarily mean both. For example, in irony S might say, "You got
what you wanted, did you not?" while meaning exactly the opposite: "You did not get
what you wanted, did you?" In this case, S means not what is literally said, but only what
is as it were unsaid.
60. On the terminology of "primary" and "secondary" acts in the study of indirection,
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We are left with the central question of how does H get from the literal
meaning of the secondary act to the intended meaning of the primary
act? In the realm of conversational exchanges, it is fair to say that many
of the pragmatic strategies used by H, and assumed by S, are reasonably
well understood from a technical point of view. S uses a number of theo-
retical and interpretive tools to infer what the primary illocutionary act
must be on the basis of word and sentence meaning, as well as back-
ground facts about the context of utterance, and the nature and history of
the conversation. Besides the theory of speech acts, these tools include
powers of reasoning generally possessed and assumed by speakers of L,
and various principles of conversational cooperation. These principles
consist of, among other things, a general cooperative principle by which
H assumes that S is cooperating in the conversation, and therefore is at-
tempting to make a contribution which is appropriate to the conversation
at the time and place it is made. In this respect H assumes that S will
seek to adhere to such maxims of conversation as that, in making a con-
tribution, S will say just as much as is required (neither more nor less),
will endeavor to make a contribution that is truthful, and will strive both
to be relevant and to convey the contribution as clearly as possible."
As for door-opening, then, how does H proceed? Suppose S, who is on
the way home, is burdened with packages and does not have a free hand.
H, who is accompanying S, is standing outside the door, and declares to S
"We need to go inside and warm up," to which S replies, "Could you
open the door?" What must be determined is how H understands the
primary illocutionary act-the request that H open the door-on the ba-
sis of the secondary act-the question whether H is able to open it. As-
sume that H already understands, by virtue of her knowledge of the syn-
tax and semantics of L, the literal meaning of the secondary act. The
process of reasoning that H will then follow' 2 is roughly:
(1) I have made a simple assertion expressing my belief that we
need to go inside and warm up, and in response S has asked
whether I am able to open the door. (Conversational Fact).
(2) I assume S is talking to me. (Principles of Conversational
Cooperation).
(3) S is probably adhering to the maxim of relevance. (Inference
from (1) and (2)).
see SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 50, at 30-57.
61. These are the so-called Griceian maxims of quantity, quality, relation, and man-
ner. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22-40 (1989).
62. This lengthy series of steps will not generally be undertaken in any conscious way.
Nonetheless, the knowledge and reasoning depicted here are certainly part of the set of
pragmatic skills mastered by competent speakers of L.
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(4) A relevant remark in this context will further the conversa-
tion at hand by responding to what has been said through com-
mentary, rejection, query, and so on. (Theory of Speech Acts).
(5) The literal meaning of S's secondary act does not literally
further the conversation in these ways, and so violates the
maxim of relevance. (Inference from (1) and (4)).
(6) Given (2), however, S is probably not violating the maxim of
relevance, therefore, he probably means more than he is liter-
ally saying in the secondary illocutionary act. I reason that S
has probably performed a primary illocutionary act which dif-
fers from the secondary illocutionary act reported in (1). (In-
ference from (2), (3), and (5)).
(7) I know that I have remarked on the desirability of going in-
side, which may by itself provide S a reason for wanting to go
inside, and that since S has his hands full he probably wants to
go inside to disburden himself anyway. I also know that the
door must be opened before we can go in and that because S
cannot open it, he probably wants me to do it. (Background
Facts).
(8) For reasons of politeness, S does not want to order me to
open the door, but S also knows that I know that out of polite-
ness and other concerns, those who are able to open doors often
assist those who are not. (Background Fact).
(9) A preparatory condition on obeying an order is having the
ability to perform the act represented (that H do A) in the pro-
positional content of the order. (Theory of Speech Acts).
(10) S knows that he can indirectly and politely request that I
open the door by questioning the preparatory condition on an
order that I open the door. (Theory of Speech Acts).
(11) Since I understood the literal meaning of S's utterance in
(1), which questioned the preparatory condition on an order
that I open the door, S probably has made an indirect request
that I open it. That indirect request is probably S's primary illo-
cutionary act. (Conversational Facts and Theory of Speech
Acts).
Here I have rehearsed a series of inferences that represent knowledge
possessed and manipulated in some form by interlocutors in L. In doing
so I have illustrated just a single conventionalized method for making in-
direct requests. In step (10), I identified the questioning of the prepara-
tory condition (Can you do A? Could you do A?) as one method by
means of which a speaker could successfully make an indirect request.
There are, however, several other ways in which such indirect requests
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can be accomplished. For example, one can assert as well as question the
preparatory condition (You could open the door; You can open the
door), and one can assert the sincerity condition on Directives, that is,
assert one's desire or wish or want that H do A (I would like you to A; I
hope you will do A; I would appreciate it if you would do A, and so on).
One can also question H's willingness to do A (Would you do A? Do
you want to do A? Would you mind doing A for me?), and can question
whether the propositional content condition will be satisfied, that is,
whether H will do A (Will you open the door? Are you going to open
the door? Are you not going to open it?). Finally, in one of the richer
categories, one can utter sentences of various types concerning reasons
for doing A (You ought to open doors for people; It would be a good
idea if you would open this door; We would be better off if you would
open the door; Why not open doors?). Moreover, I should note that cer-
tain formulas are clearly off limits: to wit, while one can make an indirect
directive by stating that the sincerity condition obtains for S (I want you
to A), one cannot ask whether it obtains (Do I want you to do A?).63
In a moment, I will want to discern whether and how communications
in the Strait crisis map onto these methodological categories for making
indirect Directives. But since deterrence conditionals embody not only
Directives, in the form of orders, but also Commissives, in the form of
threats, I should first take account of methodological categories for
making garden variety indirect Commissives. Acts in which S questions
the preparatory condition include those in which S questions or asserts
her ability to do A (Can I do A? I can take care of it), and those in which
she asks whether H wants her to perform the act (Do you want me to do
A? Would you like me to take care of it?). In addition, some communi-
cations concern the speaker's desire to do the act and his assertion of the
sincerity condition (I would like to take care of it, or I want or am willing
to do it), while others concern the speaker's intention to do it and his as-
sertion of that intention (I am going to do A; I plan to do it for you).
And some simply assert or question the propositional content condition
(I am going do A no matter what; Shall I do it this afternoon?).
63. Only with the special stage setting of a rhetorical question could this formula be
used to make an indirect order.
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TABLE 1
Directive Acts Commissive Acts
Essential Counts as Attempt by S Counts as Undertaking by S
Condition to get H to do A of Obligation to do A
Proposition S predicates a future act S predicates a future act A of
Content A of H S
Condition
Sincerity S wants H to do A S intends to do A
Condition I I
Preparatory H is able to perform A S is able to perform A H
Condition wants S to perform A
Finally, as with Directives, one can state or question reasons for doing
the act represented in the propositional content condition (It would be a
good idea for me to do it; Would it be good for everyone if I did it?
Should I not take care of it right away?). And as with Directives, certain
formulas are ill formed; in particular, while S can perform an indirect
Commissive by asserting that S's sincerity condition obtains (I want to do
A), S cannot do it successfully by questioning whether it does obtain (Do
I want to do A?).64 Table 1 above summarizes the features of acts in the
Directive and Commissive classes which are relied upon in the various
forms of indirection I have just discussed. 65
4. Verbal Strategies in the Strait
Now how do these methods of indirection map onto verbal communi-
cations in the Strait? I turn my attention again to the broad assertion
that there would be grave consequences if China attacked Taiwan, since
this was apparently one of the speech acts most frequently performed in
public by U.S. officials during the crisis. In these cases, S meant exactly
what was said: "There will be grave consequences," but also meant, and
primarily meant something more directive, namely, "Do not attack Tai-
wan!" Yet, as with opening the door, the Chinese interlocutors of these
American officials likely had no difficulty whatsoever in understanding
what was meant in each instance. Again, indirection presents a puzzle.
How is it that S can say one thing and mean that thing and something
else as well? And how can H understand perfectly what S intends to say
given that the sentence H hears is not, or not entirely, what S means?
64. Again, only with the special stage setting of a rhetorical question can this form
succeed.
65. SEARLE, ExPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 50, at 44.
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In a surprisingly straightforward way, the sentence here uttered by S
("There will be grave consequences if you attack Taiwan") serves as the
means by which S produces the desired effect in H of understanding what
S meant or intended ("Do not attack Taiwan!"). Let us again use the
terminology "secondary" illocutionary act for the assertive sentence S ac-
tually uttered, and "primary" illocutionary act for the order S chiefly in-
tended to convey to H (as in the door opening case, where S performed
the primary act by means of performing the secondary act).
Again, we want to see how H gets from the literal meaning of the sec-
ondary act to the intended meaning of the primary act by way of prag-
matic strategies and theoretical and interpretive tools including the the-
ory of speech acts, various principles of conversational cooperation,
powers of rational inference, and background facts. I know that in the
Strait, on the day prior to the March 10 "consequences" assertion by U.S.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher (that there would be grave conse-
quences if the Chinese tried to resolve that problem by force),66 Beijing
announced it was expanding its war games and would close a large sec-
tion of the Taiwan Strait so that it could conduct "live fire" exercises with
naval ships and warplanes from March 12 through 20.67 In addition,
China announced that from March 21 through 23, the day of Taiwan's
presidential election, it would stage large-scale amphibious exercises on
Chinese islands off the coast of Guangdong and Fujian provinces adja-
cent to Taiwan involving 150,000 troops.66
How then does H proceed? How do the Chinese understand the Sec-
retary's primary illocutionary act (the order "Don't attack Taiwan!") on
the basis of the secondary act (the assertion that "there will be really
grave consequences if they try to resolve that problem by force")? As-
sume that H already understands the literal meaning of the secondary
act. The process of reasoning that H will then follow is roughly:
(1) We have made a simple announcement about our plans to
stage further war games in the Taiwan Strait, and in response S
has asserted that there would be "really grave consequences" if
we tried to resolve the Taiwan problem by force. (Conversa-
tional Fact).
66. See John O'Neil, U.S. Sending More Ships to Taiwan Area in Warning to China,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at A5; Dana Priest & Judith Havemann, Second Group of U.S.
Ships Sent to Taiwan: Christopher Calls Exercises By China 'Risky,' 'Reckless,' WASH.
POST, Mar. 11, 1996, at Al.
67. See Tyler, supra note 30, at 12.
68. See Steven Mufson, China Plans Live-Ammunition Tests; Naval and Air Maneu-
vers Could Add Pressure Before Taiwan's Vote, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1996, at A20.
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(2) We assume S is talking to us. (Principles of Conversational
Cooperation).
(3) S is probably adhering to the maxim of relevance. (Infer-
ence from (1) and (2)).
(4) A relevant remark in this context will further the conversa-
tion at hand by responding to what has been said through com-
mentary, rejection, query, and so on. (Theory of Speech Acts).
(5) The literal meaning of S's secondary act does not literally
further the conversation in these ways, and so violates the
maxim of relevance. (Inference from (1) and (4)).
(6) However, given (2), S is probably not violating the maxim of
relevance, therefore, S probably means more than S is literally
saying in the secondary illocutionary act. We reason that S has
probably performed a primary illocutionary act which differs
from the secondary illocutionary act stated in (1). (Inference
from (2), (3), and (5)).
(7) We know that we have announced our plans to stage further
war games in the Strait, and that such plans are likely to con-
cern S since S has close relations with Taiwan. We also know
that S may wonder whether we intend to attack Taiwan (and
has alluded to this possibility in using the word "force") because
S is committed in writing to defending Taiwan against such an
attack. Such a defense would likely involve a military confron-
tation with us, and this would generally be seen as a "grave con-
sequence" of any attack by us on Taiwan. (Background Facts).
(8) Grave consequences are generally seen as undesirable con-
sequences, so S probably does not want them to materialize.
(Background Fact).
(9) To avoid those consequences, S will probably try to moti-
vate us not to attack Taiwan. S knows that we may acquire that
motivation if threatened by S, and that S could order us not to
attack and link that order conditionally to a threat to impose a
significant cost upon us if we do not obey. (Theory of Speech
Acts).
(10) However, S does not want to order us directly not to at-
tack, or to threaten us directly, because we might find such be-
havior provocative. Therefore, S will probably use indirect
means. (Background Facts and Theory of Speech Acts).
(11) S has just asserted a reason ("grave consequences") why it
would not be a good idea to attack Taiwan. S knows that by
stating a reason of this sort, S can indirectly and non-
provocatively order us not to attack Taiwan, while indirectly
threatening to injure us if we do. Therefore, S's primary illocu-
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tionary act is probably to threaten us conditionally with harm
unless we obey its order not to attack Taiwan. (Theory of
Speech Acts).
Thus, in this instance, the preferred illocutionary strategy for indirec-
tion was the assertion of a reason for H to obey the indirectly issued or-
der, which amounted to a reason for avoiding potential injury or cost.
This appears to have been an attractive rhetorical strategy for U.S. poli-
cymakers in the State Department, and apparently a source of compara-
tively substantial data because this form of indirection was used several
times in late March 1996 at the height of the crisis: the "consequences"
strategy surfaced in remarks by National Security Adviser Anthony
Lake,69 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Winston
Lord,7° and State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns,7 in addition
to those of Secretary of State Christopher. Since U.S. naval forces were
already in the vicinity of the Strait, and in each case the remarks were
made in conjunction with, or temporally close to, announcements re-
garding the disposition of those forces, the implied threat was perhaps
most reasonably associated with military action. However, in a notable
variation on the "consequences" strategy which appeared in remarks by
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, the implied threat was economic
rather than military. In remarks made in Hong Kong, also at the height
of the crisis, Secretary Rubin pointedly tied Beijing's untoward conduct
to the potential loss of trade benefits which could have been worth sev-
eral billion dollars to China.73 Thus, the reasons for obeying the order
indirectly expressed by S account for an important portion of the corpus
of indirect utterances used by the United States in the Strait crisis.
Another important portion of the corpus is composed of speech acts
concerning the disposition of U.S. naval assets and military forces gener-
ally. Consider the announcement by the White House on March 11,
1996, that a second aircraft carrier battle group, headed by the U.S.S.
Nimitz, would join the group headed by the U.S.S. Independence, which
69. See Priest & Havemann, supra note 66 at Al (discussing the public statements of
Mr. Lake on the potential "grave consequences" of any Chinese aggression against Tai-
wan).
70. See Interview by Charlayne Hunter-Gault with Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary
of State (MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour, Mar. 11, 1996) <http://www.pbs.org/newshour>.
71. See Keith B. Richburg, Of Missiles and Chinese Mind Games, WASH. POST, Mar.
7, 1996, at A24 (quoting Mr. Burns as saying that there would be unspecified "conse-
quences" if Chinese war games harmed persons in the Strait).
72. See Priest & Havemann, supra note 66, at Al (citing the public statements of Sec-
retary Christopher).
73. See U.S., China Clash in Battle of Rhetoric, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20, 1996, at 6 [here-
inafter Battle of Rhetoric] (citing the public statements of Secretary Rubin).
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was already on station near Taiwan. The naval forces of the Nimitz
group, like those of the Independence, provided very tangible where-
withal to make good the threat component of the deterrence conditionals
in the Strait crisis.74
In this case, again, S meant exactly what was said-"The Nimitz has
been dispatched to the Strait"-but also meant, and primarily meant,
something more, namely, "I can impose a very substantial military cost
on you." Yet, as in the previous cases, the Chinese interlocutors of these
American officials likely had no difficulty whatsoever in understanding
what was meant in each instance. Thus reappears the puzzle: How can S
say one thing, mean that thing, and mean something else as well? And
how can H understand perfectly what S intends to say, given that the sen-
tence H hears is not, or not entirely, what S actually means? How does
H receive the literal meaning of the secondary act, which after all is
merely an announcement of the movement of a group of ships, but un-
derstand the intended meaning of the primary act, that a powerful force
can be used to impose a great cost on H?
Regarding the Strait conflict, we know that on the day before the
March 11 announcement of the Nimitz deployment, Secretary Christo-
pher made his "consequences" assertion, which followed Beijing's chill-
ing declaration the previous day regarding its expanded plans for war
games and missile launches. The Nimitz deployment, then, was in close
proximity to what might be described fairly as planned deployments by
Beijing, which were at least similar in kind, even if comparatively modest
in scale. Given such a stage setting, how, and with what interpretive
strategy, does H proceed? How do the Chinese understand the primary
illocutionary act on the basis of the secondary? Assuming, as before,
that H already understands the literal meaning of the secondary act, the
process of reasoning which H then follows is roughly:
(1) We have made a simple announcement about our plans to
stage further war games in the Taiwan Strait, and in response S
has asserted, first, that there will be "really grave conse-
quences" if we try to resolve the Taiwan problem by force, and
then, subsequently, that S is dispatching an armada to join an-
other armada already near the Strait. (Conversational Fact).
(2) We assume S is talking to us. (Principles of Conversational
Cooperation).
(3) S is probably adhering to the maxim of relevance. (Infer-
ence from (1) and (2)).
74. The analogous relationship holds for deterrence conditionals intended by Beijing
to apply to Taiwan.
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(4) A relevant remark in this context will further the conversa-
tion at hand by responding to what has been said through com-
mentary, rejection, query, and so on. (Theory of Speech Acts).
(5) The literal meaning of S's secondary act does not literally
further the conversation in these ways, and so violates the
maxim of relevance. (Inference from (1) and (4)).
(6) However, given (2), S is probably not violating the maxim of
relevance, therefore S probably means more than S is literally
saying in the secondary illocutionary act. We reason that S has
probably performed a primary illocutionary act which differs
from the secondary illocutionary act stated in (1). (Inference
from (2), (3), and (5)).
(7) We know that we have announced our plans to stage further
war games in the Strait, and that this is likely to concern S since
S has close relations with Taiwan. We also know that S may
wonder whether we intend to attack Taiwan because S is com-
mitted in writing to defending Taiwan against such an attack.
Such a defense would likely involve a military confrontation
with us. (Background Facts).
(8) The armada S has sent to the Strait, along with that already
on station, would enable S to inflict great damage on us.
(Background Fact).
(9) S has already asserted that grave consequences will result if
we attack Taiwan. Grave consequences are generally seen as
undesirable consequences, so S probably does not want them to
materialize. (Background Fact).
(10) To avoid such consequences, S will probably try to moti-
vate us not to attack Taiwan. S knows that we may acquire that
motivation if threatened by S, and that S could order us not to
attack and link that order conditionally to a threat to impose a
significant cost upon us if we do not obey. (Theory of Speech
Acts).
(11) But S does not want to order us directly not to attack, or to
threaten us directly, since we might find such behavior provoca-
tive. Therefore, S will probably use indirect means. (Back-
ground Facts and Theory of Speech Acts).
(12) S has just made an assertion about a preparatory condition
for making good on a threat (that S has the ability to perform
the threatened act). S knows that when S makes an assertion
about S's ability in this way, we will link the threat to S's desire
that we not attack Taiwan, and we will understand S to be tell-
ing us that if we refrain from attacking Taiwan, S will not make
good on S's threat. (Theory of Speech Acts).
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Thus, in this instance, the preferred illocutionary strategy for indirec-
tion was the assertion of a fact about S's ability to carry out threats
against H. This, like the assertion of reasons for obeying S's order to re-
frain from attacking Taiwan, appears to have been an attractive rhetori-
cal strategy for U.S. policymakers, as indicated by its frequent use. It was
relied upon at several critical junctures during the height of the crisis, for
example, when announcements regarding major deployments of naval
assets or attributes of those assets were made by Secretary of Defense
William Perry, Secretary Christopher, and the White House.75
D. Further Observations
Now that we have spelled out some of the most basic relations between
deterrence and communicative indirection, I want to examine briefly the
role that indirection played in the interpretation of the TRA during the
Strait crisis. I begin that task with a few observations about conventions,
politeness, and deniability in indirection.
1. Conventions and Politeness
In this Strait confrontation, without doing an exhaustive inventory of
communications among the parties, we have observed that the United
States made prominent use of two forms of indirection: (1) assertions
concerning good military reasons, such as grave consequences, and good
economic reasons, such as trade losses, for China to refrain from attack-
ing Taiwan; and (2) assertions concerning a preparatory condition on
American threats against China-the disposition of U.S. naval assets.
While there is, as I have shown, a wide range of formulas available for
use in indirection, these specific "good reasons" and "preparatory condi-
tion" forms appear to have been favored by the United States. They
were chosen instead of forms which question H's sincerity condition (Do
you want to refrain from attacking Taiwan?), assert H's preparatory con-
dition (You could leave Taiwan alone), or question the satisfaction of a
propositional content condition (Will you not attack Taiwan?). The pre-
ferred forms were not just chosen indifferently from a stable of rough
semantic equivalents; instead, they were chosen because they were ap-
propriate in ways that other, technically permissible choices were not. In
simple terms, this was because the preferred forms were idiomatic ex-
pressions in the circumstances; they reflected conventions of usage and
75. See infra notes 138-139, 144-46 and accompanying text (examining U.S. Diplo-
matic attempts at communicative deterrence, coupled with strategic naval maneuvers).
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thus were the vehicles of choice for representing the meaning intentions
of the speakers involved in this martial conflict.
Now one might reasonably wonder both why conventionalized devices
are favored in this way, and also why indirect conventionalized devices
are also favored. First, economic considerations come to the fore. As in
other areas of verbal communication and signaling systems generally,
conventions are efficient. They are efficient because they serve as valu-
able aids to interpretation. They make communication between inter-
locutors easier and less prone to interpretive error, because they operate
to reduce the range of possible intended meanings to those that are typi-
cally used in a given circumstance.
Second, considerations of politeness are also of key importance. As in
other areas of verbal communication, one important motivation for the
use of indirect forms in martial confrontation is certainly politeness." It
is, however, politeness with a twist. In cases of ordinary verbal politeness
achieved through issuing, for example, indirect requests, one gives one's
interlocutor room to maneuver. By this I mean that it is not entirely pre-
supposed by S that H can or will do the action requested. For example,
when a request is made to open the door (Can you open it?), it is not
necessarily assumed that H can (Oh, I am terribly sorry, but I do not
have a feel for that kind of lock). In addition, H can reasonably decline
to do the requested action, or at any rate it is generally presupposed in
this form of request that H is able to decline (Oh, I hope you do not
mind, but I have got to run upstairs to get the phone). This room to ma-
neuver is generally not present in cases where direct orders are issued. In
those cases, the ordering party is typically authorized to issue the order,
and the ordered party is typically able to do the deed; moreover, the or-
dered party is generally not expected or permitted to decline to do it as
when, for example, a superior military officer issues orders to inferiors, a
senior corporate officer commands and supervises subordinates, or par-
ents instruct and direct their own minor children.
In our martial case by contrast, H is given nominal room to maneuver
militarily and perhaps politically insofar as the order is indirect; in this
sense a measure of formal politeness is intended. The requirement that
H be physically able to perform the ordered action (the preparatory con-
dition on orders) is presumed just as it is in the direct order cases. But
voluntary compliance (the option of refusal) is essentially a formality,
and herein lies the twist-both parties are well aware that S does not re-
76. See generally PENELOPE BROWN & STEPHEN LEVINSON, POLITENESS: SOME
UNIVERSALS IN LANGUAGE USAGE (1987); ROBIN T. LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND
WOMAN'S PLACE (1975) (considering issues of deference from a linguistic point of view).
1997]
Catholic University Law Review
gard the fulfillment of the indirect order as optional, and that the point of
the deterrent threat is that S likely will not physically permit H to decline
to do what S wants H to do. At the same time, however, it is critically
important that H appear, if only on the basis of the indirect form of the
communication, to have the option of refusal. This counts as a "face-
saving" gesture-behavior which sustains or leaves relatively undamaged
H's reputation and nominal autonomy even while H takes measures to
obey S's order. To do the opposite, to give the impression that H has no
such option and must simply obey S's direct order, would impose a
greater reputational cost on H, and might even provoke H into indulging
in greater belligerence.
2. Deniability
In the Strait crisis, there was at least one example of this brand of po-
liteness taken to an important extreme. In December 1995, as the crisis
was quickly heating up, but three months before it came to a head, the
U.S.S. Nimitz sailed through the Taiwan Strait. As it happened, this was
the first occasion since the normalization of Sino-American relations in
1978 that an American warship had made such passage. While Beijing
was quite upset by the event and vocal in its criticism of the United
States, the incident was characterized by a U.S. Defense Department
spokesman as a strictly weather-related ship movement which otherwise
had no geo-strategic purpose. 7' This sequence of events is emblematic of
a relatively extreme version of politico-diplomatic politeness in a deter-
rence context. A martial act is reported" and all but universally con-
strued as an indirect order designed to deter Chinese aggression against
Taiwan. Yet, the would-be deterrer effectively denies that it possesses
either the desire to deter China or the intention to use the ship move-
ment as a device to represent a belligerent intention (such as, "Refrain
from attacking Taiwan or I will impose a great cost on you"). I label this
form of indirection in deterrence deniability in the service of politeness.
This form, as a variation on the "room to maneuver" type of politeness
discussed above, enables H to save face, that is to appear in some sense
to be freely choosing to perform the future act which S very much wants
H to perform, namely, the act of refraining from attacking Taiwan.79
77. See infra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing this incident).
78. It is, incidentally, not certain that much of the world, including the Chinese,
would have known about the passage had the Pentagon not reported the event in a press
conference.
79. This circumstance is closely related to, but distinguishable from, one in which S
orders H to do A, and then denies wanting H to do A. I demonstrated earlier that for Di-
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3. Interpreting the TRA
We asked earlier what the connections were between signaling, indi-
rection, and U.S. domestic law, and we are now in a position to remark
on some of them. When I considered American actions in the Strait cri-
sis in light of the TRAj8 it appeared that the actions fell well within the
constraints of U.S. statutory law. Having now scrutinized the dynamics
of indirection, we are in a position to see that American communicative
acts designed to deter in the Strait crisis may well have been undertaken
with a view to limiting the ways in which the TRA would and perhaps
could be interpreted both during and after the crisis. Most notably, U.S.
decision makers were faced with the important question of what assis-
tance the United States could legally provide Taiwan under the TRA, as
well as the perhaps thornier question-particularly in future years-of
what assistance the United States would be obliged to provide Taiwan
under the TRA. In this area, there are at least two leading points to be
made: first, the heavy use of indirect deterrence conditionals by U.S. offi-
cials-the mention of good reasons for Chinese restraint; of the quality,
type, and disposition of U.S. naval assets, and so forth-had the remark-
able effect at the end of the day of attaching the United States to virtu-
ally no explicit commitment to action. Put another way, the United
States rather consistently declined to interpret the TRA precisely or say
what exactly it would do if China attacked Taiwan.8 Second, in this con-
nection, it is worth noting that the Clinton administration took very dif-
ferent attitudes toward the two congressional actions aimed at diminish-
ing Chinese belligerence. The administration pointedly criticized the
House Bill, which used very explicit language advocating U.S. interven-
tion on Taiwan's behalf in compliance with the TRA if China took more
aggressive action,82 while endorsing a Senate measure that employed
rectives, one cannot both perform the act of ordering and at the same time deny that one
has the underlying psychological state associated with ordering, without risking contradic-
tion; that is, S cannot order H to do A (Take out the trash!), while simultaneously denying
that he wants H to do A (But I do not want you to take out the trash). In the standard
case of indirection, S will make an indirect request (Can you open the door?) and cheer-
fully assent to any corresponding psychological state query: "Do you want me to open the
door?"
80. See supra Part III.A. (discussing the legality of American action during the crisis
under the TRA).
81. For example, U.S. communications during the crisis reflected a conspicuous ab-
sence of deterrence conditionals justifying the TRA as controlling, such as: "Do X, or else
we will do Y, under the authority of the TRA," or "If you fail to do X, we will be com-
pelled to do Y under the terms of the TRA," or "The TRA requires that if you do not do
X, we will have to do Y."
82. See H.R.Con. Res. 140,104th Cong. (1996) (enacted) (declaring "that any attempt
by the People's Republic of China to threaten the peace and security of Taiwan is a threat
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comparatively soft language and was free of any hard and fast commit-
ments to come to Taiwan's defense.83 Perhaps not wanting to establish a
precedent which might backfire if relations with Taiwan and China took
an unpredictable turn, the administration thus conveyed the distinct im-
pression of attempting to leave itself and its successors as much flexibility
as possible in interpreting the requirements of the TRA.84
V. CONCLUSION
My very strong claim that some rules and principles of linguistic sys-
tems may usefully explain certain kinds of strategic communication is still
no more than a hypothesis. Much more empirical investigation is neces-
sary before we can demonstrate that the primary and secondary illocu-
tionary acts, verbal and non-verbal representing devices, and rational
strategies presented above, are actually relied upon by actors in non-
nuclear deterrence situations. At the same time, however, I believe we
have shed light on some important relations between orders and threats,
and between direct and indirect signals where orders and threats are in-
volved. I hope that this work will illuminate a path for further investiga-
tions of both this particular confrontation-especially the study of Chi-
nese and Taiwanese actions-and the investigation of similar
confrontations elsewhere.
to peace and security in the Pacific and tantamount to the interests of the United States").
83. See S. Con. Res. 43, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted) ("the Government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China should cease its bellicose actions directed at Taiwan and instead
enter into meaningful dialogue with the Government of Taiwan").
84. See Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, State-
ment Before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the House International Re-
lations Committee (Mar. 14, 1996), in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, Mar. 25, 1996
(characterizing the Strait crisis as not constituting "a threat to Taiwan of the magnitude
contemplated by the drafters of the TRA").
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VI. APPENDIX: A BRIEF HISTORY OF EVENTS FROM
MAY 1995 TO MARCH 1996
In this appendix, I sketch a narrative of the events leading up to the
Strait confrontation. Very briefly, I cover, first, the backdrop of recent
Sino-Taiwan commercial and political relations against which the crisis
unfolded, and second, the essential details of the ten-month period when
the crisis intensified and came to a resolution. Part One covers the
Summer of 1995, Part Two the Fall of 1995, and Part Three the Winter of
1996.
China has regularly refused to rule out the use of force against Taiwan,
and has consistently identified three main circumstances under which it
would use force: first, if Taiwan officially declared itself an independent
state; second, if there were foreign intervention in Taiwan; and, third, if
Taiwan were beset by serious civil unrest . With the rapid growth of
cross-Strait commercial and cultural communications in recent years-a
direct consequence of China's Opening to the Outside World in 1979-
these three scenarios for using force had until recently largely receded
into the dim realm of stale political bluster.16  Person-to-person
exchanges began in 1987 and have numbered more than seven million in
the ten years since.8 Trade in goods began formally in 1991, and two-
way trade now amounts to about US $20 billion annually while
Taiwanese direct investment in China exceeds US $20 billion.m These
robust trade links have played a large part in improving bilateral
relations and in reducing tensions to their lowest levels since the
Nationalists fled the Communist takeover of the mainland in 1949. The
rehabilitated relationship, however, began to collapse quite suddenly in
85. See China Won't Give Up Its Principle On Taiwan Issue, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Mar. 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5574347 (noting continued adherence to
these principles); Tan Tarn How, No Change in Taiwan Policy, STRAITS TIMES (Singa-
pore), Dec. 1, 1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 10241458 (same); Marcus Warren, Two
Chinas Return To Sabre Rattling, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 11, 1996, at 26,
available in 1996 WL 3927486 (same).
86. While China ceased its routine symbolic shelling of the Taiwan-controlled islands
Quemoy and Matsu on January 1, 1979, Taiwan did not relax its "Three Nos" policy-no
contact, no negotiation, no compromise-until 1987 when then President Chiang Ching-
kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, began to permit Taiwanese to visit mainland relatives.
See Chong-Pin Lin, Beijing and Taipei: Dialectics in Post-Tiananmen Interactions, in
GREATER CHINA: THE NEXT SUPERPOWER? 118 (David Shambaugh ed., 1995); see also
LAI TO LEE, THE REUNIFICATION OF CHINA: PRC-TAIWAN RELATIONS IN FLUX (1991).
87. In 1988, 450,000 Taiwanese visited the mainland, and, by 1992, visits were totaling
1.5 million annually. See David Shambaugh, Security Issues Intensify, FREE CHINA REV.,
Mar. 1996, at 55-65.
88. See supra note 84 (noting the comments of Assistant Secretary of State Lord re-
garding the rapid increase in Taiwan's annual exports, particularly to the P.R.C.).
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ever, began to collapse quite suddenly in the Summer of 1995 after the
United States granted Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui a visa in June
1995 to attend a reunion at Cornell University. 9
A. Summer 1995
The U.S. grant of a visa to President Lee Teng-hui was an extraordi-
nary act insofar as no Taiwanese leader had been officially allowed to
visit the United States since 1979 when the United States downgraded its
relations with Taiwan to unofficial status. The private visitation grant
was apparently motivated in large part by the persuasive influence of
votes in favor of the visa by both the U.S. Senate, which had voted 97 to
1 in favor, and the House of Representatives, which had voted 396 to 0 in
favor. 9" Despite Lee's explicit and often repeated statements to the con-
trary, 9' the Chinese viewed the U.S. trip as hard evidence that the Tai-
wanese leadership had decided to seek formal independence, and had
sent Lee on the trip as part of a plan to gain greater international visibil-
ity for Taiwan, and to have Lee generally display the posture of a na-
tional leader in foreign countries.2 Taipei's interest in acceding to the
89. In 1968, President Lee earned a Ph.D. in agricultural economics at Cornell, where
he had studied from 1965 to 1967. The reunion took place on June 9, 1995. For valuable
biographical notes on Lee, see Marcus W. Brauchli, Why Historic Election In Taiwan Is
Rattling Both China and U.S., WALL ST. J., Feb. 26,1996, at Al. The Chinese leadership
was already quite upset over a decision made during the administration of President
George Bush to sell Taiwan 150 advanced American fighter planes. See James Sterngold,
U.S.-China Tensions Over Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1992, at Dl. The Chinese re-
garded the sale as a violation of the agreement reached with the Reagan administration to
gradually diminish the quantity and quality of arms that the United States would sell Tai-
wan. See supra note 15 for the Joint Communiqu6 of August 17, 1982.
90. See Steven Greenhouse, Aides to Clinton Say He Will Defy Beijing and Issue a
Visa to Taiwan's President, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1995, at A6. Some Asia experts in the
State Department opposed the granting of the visa, fearing the damage it might cause to
relations with China, but were overruled by Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
Those who recommended the visa sought to avoid a high-stakes contest with Congress
which the White House stood to lose, apparently because of sufficient votes in Congress to
override a presidential veto. The Chinese ambassador to the United States, Li Dao-yu,
was informed of the administration's decision by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake
and Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff, who told him that if President Clinton did not
grant a visa, Congress might adopt a binding resolution that would not only require him to
do so, but would also upgrade the American relationship with Taiwan. See id. A transit
visa was granted later for a separate visit by Taiwan's Vice-President as well. See U.S.
Gives Transit Visa To Taiwan Vice President, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7, 1996, at 2.
91. For an example, see Thomas L. Friedman, The View From Taipei, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3,1995, §4, at 11 (discussing President Lee's views on the future of Taiwan).
92. Chinese President Jiang Zemin had issued an "Eight-Point Plan" concerning re-
unification on January 30, 1995, which, while nominally discussing trade and culture, was
quite explicit in asserting a "one China" principle, opposing any "independence" move-
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World Trade Organization," its offer of a US $1 billion contribution for a
U.N. developing countries fund in exchange for a U.N. seat,9 and its re-
cent formation of full diplomatic ties with a handful of smaller nations,95
have added to communist speculation that a not-so-covert independence
drive has risen to the top of Taiwan's agenda.96
Beijing responded to Lee's U.S. visit with dramatic diplomatic and
military action, and harsh rhetoric. The commander-in-chief of the Chi-
nese Air Force, General Yu Zhenwu, cut short an official visit to U.S.
ment on Taiwan, and not ruling out the use of force against Taiwan. Taiwanese President
Lee Teng-hui, responding with his own "Six-Point Speech" on April 8, 1995, coolly re-
buffed President Jiang by characterizing China and Taiwan as being "governed by two po-
litical sovereign entities since 1949," declaring that "[b]oth sides should participate in in-
ternational organizations," and asserting that China's tendency to "use foreign
interference and Taiwan independence campaigns as an excuse to maintain a military solu-
tion" was "to ignore and distort" Taiwan's "nation-building spirit." Both statements are
reprinted in an interview by Richard R. Vuylsteke with Wei Yung, President of the Van-
guard Institute for Policy Studies, in Time to Clarify the One China Principle, FREE CHINA
REV., Mar. 1996, at 24-25.
93. Taiwan applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the predecessor to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1990, although it applied not
as an independent state, but as the customs union of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu.
Presumably, it applied under this status to avoid antagonizing Beijing, which had also ini-
tially filed a GATT application in 1986. Both applications are presently the subject of
GATT/WTO study groups. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, GA TT Membership in a Changing
World Order: Taiwan, China, and the Former Soviet Republics, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 19, 24, 27; James V. Feinerman, The Quest for GATT Membership: Will Taiwan Be
Allowed to Enter Before China?, CHINA BUS. REV., May-June 1992, at 24-27; James V.
Feinerman, Taiwan and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 39, 40-42.
94. See Pamela Burdman, Taiwan Offers to Buy Its Way into the U.N.: Outcast Nation
Says It Will Pay $1 Billion, S.F. CHRON., June 27, 1995, at Al.
95. Between 1989 and 1991 Taiwan was formally recognized as a sovereign state by
Grenada, Liberia, Belize, Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, and the Central African
Republic. In each case, however, Beijing withdrew its own embassy from the country
granting recognition. At the same time, Taipei began to move much more aggressively in
enhancing relations with France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Poland, Czechoslova-
kia, Hungary, Vietnam, North Korea, and the then Soviet Union. See Lin, supra note 86,
at 121.
96. See Beijing Meeting On "Taiwan Independence" Book, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Mar. 10, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5573095; Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman On Lee
Teng-hui's Statement, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Xinhua File; "Common Life Community," Fomenting Separatism, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Aug. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua File; Lien's Visit To
Czech Republic-Another Attempt At "Two Chinas," XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 23,
1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua File; Make More Efforts For Unifica-
tion, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5570084; Qian Qichen
On U.N. Seat For Taiwan, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, March 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL
5571861. Perhaps of even greater concern to the mainland was the fact that Taiwan was
about to hold its first direct presidential election. See supra note 1 (discussing the outcome
of the election).
19971
Catholic University Law Review
Air Force installations on May 23,7' and China's ambassador to Washing-
ton, Li Daoyu, was recalled to Beijing on June 16.98 On June 18, the Chi-
nese detained American human rights activist Harry Wu, who was at-
tempting to enter China through Kazakhstan, and three weeks later
formally arrested him and charged him with espionage. 99 On June 25,
they arrested and revoked the parole of dissident Chen Ziming, who at
the behest of the Clinton administration had been released from prison
for medical reasons in 1994 after serving part of a thirteen-year sentence
for sedition in conjunction with the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in
1989.'m Then in late July 1995, Beijing undertook two missile exercises
eighty-five miles north of Taiwan, and in four successive days fired four
medium-range surface-to-surface missiles and two ballistic missiles. °
During a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) in Brunei, Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on August 1, 1995, in an effort to
repair relations with China and secure Harry Wu's release. The results
of the ninety-minute meeting were described in cautiously optimistic
terms, but Secretary Christopher found himself upstaged by an incident
which was emblematic of a general disarray in the Clinton administra-
tion's Asia policy. Three days before the meeting, on July 29, China had
detained two Hong Kong-based American military attach6s who were
traveling in Fujian province, directly across the Strait from Taiwan.
While the incident was not discussed or even mentioned during Christo-
pher's meeting with Qian, it was made public the next day, August 2.
The following day, the two attach6s were expelled by Beijing after being
accused of illegally photographing a restricted site from which China had
been launching missiles in its attempt to intimidate Taiwan. They were
97. See Chinese Visit Cut Short, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at A8.
98. See Elaine Sciolino, Angered Over Taiwan, China Recalls Its Ambassador in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1995, at 5. The recall lasted for little more than two months. See
China Sending Its Ambassador Back to U.S. as Feud Subsides, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995,
at A8.
99. See Chinese-American Dissident is Arrested on Spying Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July
8, 1995, at 2; Patrick E. Tyler, Beijing Arrests Rights Defender, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1995, §
1, at 1.
100. See Rone Tempest, Beijing Revokes Parole, Returns Dissident to Jail, L.A. TIMES,
June 27, 1995, at A13.
101. See Seth Faison, Taiwan Reports Nearby Firing Of 4 Test Missiles by China, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1995, at A2. This was widely perceived in East Asia as a strong signal
from China that it would take military action if Taiwan opted for independence, and the
exercises caused concern among China's neighbors. See Tony Walker & Laura Tyson,
Breathing Fire, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Aug. 1, 1995, at 14.
102. See Steven Mufson, China Expels Two Attaches Accused Of Spying, WASH. POST,
Aug. 3, 1995, at Al.
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believed to be the first U.S. officials publicly expelled from China since
relations were normalized in 1978.03 Christopher complained to Wash-
ington about the poor timing of the officers' actions, while the Pentagon
defended itself by explaining that the officers were not in a restricted
area and were legitimately monitoring military activities. To some the
incident reflected a basic conflict between the conciliatory approach of
the State Department to China and the Pentagon's growing concern
about Chinese military activities in the Taiwan Strait.) 4 At the same
time, there was considerable speculation that the incident had been or-
chestrated by elements of the Chinese military in order to embarrass Mr.
Qian and undermine his meeting with Secretary Christopher.05
In the interim, in China's official press, the Communist Party contin-
ued to toss rhetorical barbs at President Lee, calling him a "traitor" and
describing him as, among other things, someone who was "plotting" and
"scheming" to separate Taiwan from China, the "motherland. '"10 Be-
tween August 15 and 25, 1995, more Chinese missile "tests" followed in
an area 80 to 100 miles north of Taiwan, including tests of French Exocet
anti-ship missile clones.0 7 However, at the close of these exercises, the
Chinese, in a watershed decision, first convicted Harry Wu of spying and
then deported him,108 which not only seemed to indicate an improved
mood in Sino-American relations, but also led directly to two other
events which in all likelihood would not have otherwise occurred: a Sep-
tember visit to China by President Clinton's wife, Hillary Rodham
Clinton, to attend the United Nations Fourth World Conference on
103. Steven Greenhouse, China Arrests Start Dispute in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
4, 1995, at A4.
104. According to Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon, the two air force officers had
diplomatic passports and valid visas, were wearing civilian clothes, and had cameras in
their backpacks when they were arrested. "They were not in a restricted area" and "were
on a road with many civilians." Id.
105. It was reported that in May 1995, following an earlier meeting with Secretary
Christopher, Mr. Qian informed China's leadership that the United States would not issue
a visa to Lee Teng-hui. The Chinese military remained skeptical, and two days later the
visa was issued. See Mufson, supra note 102, at Al; see also Jim Mann, Christopher Tries
to Downplay China Incident, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1995, at All.
106. See Shambaugh, supra note 87; Patrick E. Tyler, Tough Stance Toward China
Pays Off for Taiwan Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995, at Al; Xinhua Signed Article
Slams Lee Teng-hui, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Xinhua File.
107. See Keith B. Richburg, Chinese Weapons Tests Seen Targeting Taiwanese Politics,
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1995, at A21.
108. See R.W. Apple, Jr., First Lady Will Attend Women's Conference, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 26, 1995, at 5; Seth Mydans, American Deported From China Kept Secret Diary of
Life in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1995, at 1.
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Women in Beijing, and a much-anticipated October summit meeting in
the United States between President Clinton and China's President Jiang
Zemin during celebrations marking the fiftieth anniversary of the
founding of the United Nations.0 9
B. Fall 1995
But relations soon soured further as the Women's Conference was
marred by extensive meddling, surveillance, censorship, and harassment
by Chinese authorities.'0 The summit meeting proved awkward both
procedurally and substantively as, first, President Jiang declined an invi-
tation to meet with President Clinton in Washington because the White
House would not accommodate China's request for a full ceremonial
state visit,' and, second, having finally agreed to a meeting in New York,
President Jiang balked at the choice of the New York Public Library as a
meeting site because Chinese security personnel had discovered an ex-
hibit in the library related to Beijing's 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis."'
The summit meeting was eventually held on October 24, 1995, at Lincoln
Center in New York City, however, even though the event was described
by the White House as a "very good, positive meeting" and by Chinese
officials as "candid, friendly, positive and useful," it produced no agree-
ments or understandings, and followed by only hours a speech by Presi-
dent Jiang at the United Nations in which he charged that "certain big
powers, often under the cover of freedom, democracy and human rights,
set out to encroach upon the sovereignty of other countries, interfere in
109. See Apple, supra note 108, at 5; Todd S. Purdum, The Clintons Back Parley On
Women: Foes of Trip to China Called Demagogic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995, at 10; Pat-
rick E. Tyler, Hillary Clinton in Beijing as Women's Conference Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
5,1995, at A3; Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. And China Plan Meeting of Their Leaders in October,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at Al.
110. See Seth Faison, Chinese Jostle Thousands of Women at Forum, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 1995, at All; Seth Faison, Meeting Of Women Says Surveillance By China Must
End, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, § 1, at 1; Seth Faison, 'Women In Black' Defy China's Po-
lice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1995, at A3; Patrick E. Tyler, Forum on Women Is Vexed By
Chinese Security Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at A10; Patrick E. Tyler, Meddling
By China is Seen as Marring Meeting on Women, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1995, at 1; Patrick
E. Tyler, Women at Forum Agree to Press On: Threat to Cancel Fails to End Harassment
by Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1995, at 1.
111. See Elaine Sciolino, No Appetite in Washington for a State Dinner Now, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, §1, at 10.
112. See Alison Mitchell, China's President and Clinton Meet to Repair Fences, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1995, at Al; cf. Patrick E. Tyler, China Accepts Clinton's Offer of New
York Summit Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at A6 (discussing the difficulties sur-
rounding the summit).
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their internal affairs and undermine their national unity and ethnic har-
mony." 3
Tensions continued to mount through the Fall as the Chinese staged
another round of war games in late November in an attempt to shape the
outcome of Taiwan's parliamentary elections on December 2, 1995.14
The exercises, which were centered on Dongshan Island off China's
southeast coast adjacent to Taiwan,"' came on the heels of a Beijing visit
by a high-level U.S. military delegation.' When the votes were counted,
the ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) led by President Lee
Teng-hui won eighty-five seats, which reduced by seventeen its previous
102-seat majority in the 164-member Yuan, the Taiwanese parliament;
the Chinese New Party, which was formed in 1993 by KMT rebels who
endorse a conciliatory stance toward the mainland, won twenty-one
seats, up from seven seats, and the Democratic Progressive Party, which
favors outright independence from Beijing, won fifty-four seats, up from
fifty."' The extent to which the election results were affected by the
mainland's military posturing is unclear, but from the perspective of sim-
ple voting power, the grip of the Nationalists was clearly weakened,
though they still retained a majority, and the pro-Beijing contingent en-
joyed a significant increase in support despite the offsetting gains of the
Democratic Progressive Party. For their part, the Chinese applauded the
results as a victory for "missile diplomacy," and evidently fashioned a
new slogan in advance of the upcoming March 1996 direct presidential
elections on Taiwan: "A vote for Lee Teng-hui is a vote for war."
' 18
C. Winter 1996
Relations deteriorated further in mid-December when Chinese pro-
democracy activist Wei Jingsheng was convicted of attempting to over-
throw the Chinese government and sentenced to a fourteen-year prison
113. Mitchell, supra note 112, at Al.
114. See Dennis Engbarth, The Giant Shadow over Taiwan's Polls, CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 2, 1995, at 19; Andrew Higgins, War-Games Threaten Taiwan, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 27, 1995, at 9.
115. Chinese television broadcast images to Taiwan of aircraft, warships, tanks, ma-
rines, and paratroopers taking part in a mock invasion. See Higgins, supra note 114, at 9.
At the same time, Beijing floated reports that it had set up a new joint command center in
Fujian province to prepare for possible action against Taiwan. See id.
116. See Patrick E. Tyler, China-U.S. Ties Warm a Bit as China-Taiwan Relations Chill,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995, at 3.
117. See Tempest, supra note 1, at A20. Fewer than 68% of eligible voters cast a bal-
lot. See 1 EUROPA, Supra note 1, at 866.
118. Lam & Chan, supra note 1, at 1.
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term for the second time in seventeen years."9 Then, on December 19,
three months before the crisis came to a head, the United States took its
first, comparatively low-key military action bearing on the conflict. A
group of American warships, led by the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Nimitz,
navigated the 120-mile wide Taiwan Strait. As these were international
waters and there was no armed conflict in the area, one might otherwise
have reasonably expected the event to be unremarkable. Owing to the
recent history of relations between China and Taiwan, however, the
seeming point of the U.S. action was not lost on the Chinese. Indeed, it
caused a serious disturbance in Beijing. No American warship had
passed through the Strait since 1978, when the United States normalized
relations with the communists, and apart from a tense period during the
Kennedy administration in 1962 when the United States discouraged Na-
tionalist forces led by Chiang Kai-shek from launching an invasion of the
mainland, there had previously been three major Sino-American crises in
the Strait, and in each case the United States had without hesitation dis-
patched formidable naval forces to the area. First, in 1950, when North
Korean troops invaded South Korea, President Truman interposed the
U.S. Seventh Fleet between the island and the mainland to protect the
Taiwanese Nationalists from any invasion designs the communists might
have been entertaining. Second, in 1955, President Eisenhower renewed
deployment of the Fleet following China's shelling of the Taiwan-held
islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and Chinese-Taiwanese air and naval
clashes in the Strait. Third, in 1958, President Eisenhower staged yet
another deployment, in an effort to deter Mao Zedong from invading
Quemoy and Matsu.
From the Chinese perspective, history was repeating itself. China has
always had uneasy relations with foreigners or "barbarians." By the time
119. See Patrick E. Tyler, Beijing Sends a Strong Warning with Long Jail Sentence for
Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at Al. Wei was originally arrested in 1979 for pro-
ducing political rhetoric unfavorable to the Communist Party during the Beijing Democ-
racy Wall Movement, and after serving 14 and one-half years of a 15-year-prison sentence,
he was released, but then re-arrested by Chinese authorities in 1994. See Patrick E. Tyler,
China Arrests Leading Dissident for the Second Time in a Month, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1994, at 1; Patrick E. Tyler, Eye On Olympics, China Frees Top Dissident, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 1993, at A6.
120. Chen Jian, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stated that while the
Taiwan Strait is an international waterway where foreign warships have a right of "harm-
less" or "innocent" passage, China was nonetheless "highly concerned" that an American
aircraft carrier would enter the sensitive strait "in view of the situation." Patrick E. Tyler,
China Hints at a Timetable To Take Control of Taiwan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1996, at A2;
see also U.S. Warship Cruises China-Taiwan Passage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1996, at 4
[hereinafter Warship Cruises Passage] (noting that U.S. naval presence in the area had
been absent for 17 years).
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of the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, which followed the first
opium war in 1839, in which overwhelming foreign military technology
was used to impose foreign rights on a less than willing empire, the Chi-
nese saw the United States and European powers as foreign devils (yang-
guizi), sinister outsiders intervening in China's internal affairs for their
own advantage. 2' In December 1995, the foreign devils were back.
For its part, the United States denied any connection between the pas-
sage of the warships through the Strait and the political conflict engulfing
China and Taiwan. Although on the one hand the U.S. Defense De-
partment made a point of publicizing the event, on the other, a Pentagon
spokesman went so far as to characterize the ship movements as
"weather-related.' '22 On January 4, however, National Security Adviser
Anthony Lake was notified by Charles Freeman, a former Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense who had just returned from meetings in China with
senior officials, that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had planned a
missile attack on Taiwan consisting of one missile strike every day for
thirty days, commencing just after the election. The administration
largely discounted this as empty rhetoric because it was inconsistent with
other intelligence data, although the so-called "Pearl Harbor factor"
caused the threatened Chinese scenario to generate residual concern in
the White House.24
In mid-February, President Lee and his running mate Lien Chan paid
visits to front-line Taiwanese troops on Quemoy and Matsu as the Chi-
nese continued a troop build-up in Fujian Province on the mainland ad-
jacent to Taiwan, where 150,000 Chinese soldiers had already been sta-
tioned."' By early March, tensions were running higher than ever.
China announced on March 5 that it would be staging missile tests from
121. See generally H.G. CREEL, CHINESE THOUGHT FROM CONFUCIUS To MAO TSE-
TUNG 235-57 (1953) (discussing China's longstanding distrust of foreigners); SPENCE, su-
pra note 32, at 117-36 (same); SSU-YO TENG & JOHN K. FAIRBANK, CHINA'S RESPONSE
TO THE WEST: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY 1839-1923, 23-84 (5th prtg. 1979) (same);
Gerrit W. Gong, China's Entry Into International Society, in THE EXPANSION OF
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 171,171-83 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson eds., 1984) (same).
122. Tyler, supra note 120, at A2. Only three weeks later, Chinese approval was given
for the American warship U.S.S. Fort McHenry to make a port call in Shanghai, which
took place in late January 1996. See Seth Faison, U.S. Warship Pays a Visit to Shanghai,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996, at A6; see also Warship Cruises Passage, supra note 120, at 4.
123. See Tyler, supra note 2, at A3.
124. See Terry Atlas & William Neikirk, U.S., China Quietly Worked to Defuse Taiwan
Crisis, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1996, at 1.
125. See Taiwan, Nervous About China, Reasserts Role on Disputed Isles, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 1996, at A10.
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March 8 to 15,126 as part of broader war games to be held prior to (and, as
it turned out, in the days following) Taiwan's March 23 presidential elec-
tions. The PLA planned to mount various live-fire maneuvers and to lob
ballistic missiles at targets fewer than twenty miles off the coast from two
of Taiwan's largest ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung, far closer to the island
than any of Beijing's previous missile shots. The very next day, March 6,
State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns publicly announced that
the Chinese had been warned that "there will be consequences should
these tests go wrong. 1 27 Nevertheless, on March 8, the tests began with
the launch of three Chinese M-9 missiles into the target area.'28 U.S. Sec-
retary of Defense William Perry immediately criticized China for con-
ducting the tests, pointing out that the missiles could easily have misfired
and caused civilian deaths, while at the same time reporting that several
U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and naval vessels were in the area, including
the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Independence. 29
While the Taiwanese appeared skeptical if anxious,"" the announce-
ment of the Chinese exercises sent shivers down the spine of the interna-
tional diplomatic community."' By the next day, March 9, Beijing an-
nounced it was expanding its games and would close a large section of
the Taiwan Strait so that it could conduct "live fire" exercises with naval
ships and warplanes from March 12 to 20.112 In addition, from March 21
to 23, the day of the election, it would stage large-scale amphibious exer-
cises involving 150,000 troops on Chinese islands off the coast of Guang-
dong and Fujian provinces adjacent to Taiwan.'33 While Chinese Trade
Minister Wu Yi described the maneuvers as routine military exercises
designed to increase the military effectiveness of the PLA, Foreign
126. See China Announces Tests of Missiles Near Taiwan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,1996, at
A10.
127. Richburg, supra note 71, at A24.
128. The M-9 is a solid fuel, conventional ballistic missile with a range of 600 kilome-
ters. See JANE'S WEAPONS SYSTEMS (Duncan Lennox ed., 1994).
129. See Taiwan Warns China on Missiles; Intimidation on Eve of Election Protested,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1996, at 10A. The U.S.S. Independence was reported to
be 200 miles northeast of Taiwan; the guided missile cruiser U.S.S. Bunker Hill was re-
portedly operating close to Taiwan's southern coast. See Tom Rhodes, U.S. Warships
Monitor Tests, TIMES (London), Mar. 9,1996, at 14.
130. See Edward A. Gargan, Chinese Missile Testing Fails to Disrupt Life on Taiwan,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at 3.
131. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Neighbors Voice Concern Cautiously, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1996, at 12.
132. See Tyler, supra note 30, at 12.
133. See Steven Mufson, China's Forces Set New Games off Taiwan, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 10, 1996, at 2.
134. See China Not Afraid Of Sanctions: Minister, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 9,
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Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated that the exercises were in-
tended "to suppress the acts of the pro-independence forces that are
trying to create two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan."'35
Only hours after Beijing's March 9 announcement of its expanded
games, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, having characterized
China's actions as "reckless" and "risky" and as smacking of "intimida-
tion and coercion," indicated on March 10, that the U.S.S. Independence
would be moved closer to Taiwan and that "if [the Chinese] try to resolve
this policy through force, rather than through peace, [it would be] a grave
matter with us. '136 National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, echoing
Secretary Christopher, predicted on the same day, but in a different set-
ting, that "if [the Chinese] attack Taiwan, there will be grave conse-
quences."'37 The next day, March 11, the White House announced that a
second aircraft carrier battle group, headed by the U.S.S. Nimitz, had
been ordered from the Persian Gulf to join the Independence,' and As-
sistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Winston Lord, reported to the
press that "[w]hat we have done is relay to the Chinese that there would
be grave consequences if they resorted to force" and "I think China un-
derstands that they would suffer great damage if they resorted to
force."'3 9 On March 12, the People's Liberation Army began its "live
fire" maneuvers and fired off a fourth M-9 on March 13.140
While Chinese officials were reported to have been conveying for
some time so-called "unambiguous signals" that they did not intend to
1996, available in 1996 WL 5572910.
135. Edward A. Gargan, Chinese, In A Move To Alarm Taiwan, Fire Test Missiles,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1996, at Al.
136. O'Neil, supra note 66, at A5; see also Priest & Havemann, supra note 66, at Al.
137. See Priest & Havemann, supra note 66, at Al.
138. See Patrick E. Tyler, China Signaling U.S. That It Will Not Invade Taiwan, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1996, at A3; Philip Shenon, Gunboat Diplomacy, '96 Model, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1996, §4, at 1. On March 7, at the invitation of National Security Adviser An-
thony Lake, Liu Huaqiu, Foreign Affairs Director of China's State Council, arrived in
Washington for discussions with Lake and other U.S. officials, including Secretary of De-
fense Perry and Secretary of State Christopher. See Atlas & Neikirk, supra note 124, at 1.
At a working lunch with Mr. Liu, Secretary Perry "recounted having learned as a soldier
the artillery technique known as bracketing-that is, firing on either side of a target before
zeroing in for the kill"-and noted that China seemed to be bracketing Taiwan with its
missile tests and exercises. Id. Acting on that concern, Secretary Perry recommended two
days later that the Nimitz battle group join the Independence group near Taiwan. See id.
The decision to move the ships was actually made by President Clinton in California on
March 9. See Michael Dobbs & R. Jeffrey Smith, Second Carrier Group Sends a Clear
Signal, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1996, at A10.
139. Interview with Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State (MacNeil-Lehrer New-
shour, Mar. 11, 1996) <http://wwl.PBS.ORG/Newshour>.
140. See Tyler, supra note 138, at A3.
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invade or attack Taiwan,1 4' by March 16, Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesman Shen Guofang denied that such assurances had been given
and declared that China had never promised to give up the use of force.
1 42
The next day, March 17, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng addressed
China's legislative body, the National People's Congress, and issued a
thinly veiled warning to Washington that "[i]f someone makes a show of
force in the Taiwan Strait, that will not only be a futile act, but it also will
make the situation all the more complicated."' 14 Within two days, the
Pentagon and the State and Treasury Departments appeared to have de-
livered, whether coordinated or not, a three-track response to Mr. Li's
warning: Defense Secretary Perry declared belligerently that "America
has the best damned navy in the world, and no one should ever forget
that,"'" while Assistant Secretary of State Lord noted in reassuring tones
that while the situation was fraught with danger, "we are not on the brink
of war,, 145 and U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin observed in Hong
Kong that China's threats to Taiwan could jeopardize renewal of trade
benefits to China worth billions of dollars.
1 46
On that same day, March 19, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed, by a vote of 369 to 14, a non-binding Resolution which made ref-
erence to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and stated that the United
States "should assist in defending [Taiwan] against invasion, missile at-
tack, or blockade by the People's Republic of China," and required the
President and Congress to consider taking actions "consistent with the
commitment of the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act" in re-
sponse to a threat to the security of Taiwan. 47 Elsewhere in Washington,
141. Id.
142. See China Denies Ruling out Taiwan Attack, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 17, 1996, at 2;
Urgent Foreign Ministry Spokesman Comments On Report, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar.
16,1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua File.
143. Patrick E. Tyler, China Warns U.S. to Keep Away From Taiwan Strait, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1996, at A3.
144. James Pringle, China Warned not to Tangle with American Navy, TIMES (Lon-
don), Mar. 20, 1996, at 12.
145. Id.
146. See Battle of Rhetoric, supra note 73, at 6. Presumably, Rubin's reference was to
the annual review of China's Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) trading privileges, which would
begin in June and were critical to China's ability to export goods to the United States at a
rate that reached $45 billion in 1995. For a comment on the Clinton administration's sub-
sequent recommendation that China's MFN privileges be renewed in 1996, see Glenn R.
Butterton, Renew MFN for China? Right Decision, Wrong Reasons, CHI. TRIB., July 3,
1996, at 27.
147. H.R. Con. Res. 140, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted). The Clinton administration,
led by Assistant Secretary of State Lord, had opposed the House Resolution, because of
its potential for misinterpretation in Asia as an American attempt to modify the TRA, and
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at the annual meeting of U.S. and Taiwanese defense officials concerning
Taiwan's defense needs, U.S. officials gave provisional approval for the
sale to Taiwan of various weapons systems; though the administration
portrayed the sale as strictly routine and the weapons list as "fairly mod-
est," it did include shoulder-fired Stinger surface-to-air missiles, which
148were potentially useful in the short-term against Chinese aircraft.
Two days after the House action on China, the Senate, on March 21,
passed its own non-binding Resolution by a vote of 97 to 0. Though it
lacked the explicit mention of U.S. intervention adopted by the House,
the Senate Resolution called on China to "cease its bellicose actions di-
rected at Taiwan" and called on President Clinton to consult immedi-
ately with Congress if China's missile tests and military exercises posed
an actual threat to Taiwan's peace and security.149 The Chinese lashed
out immediately, asserting that it was "very irresponsible for the United
States side to sell advanced weapons to a sensitive area at a sensitive
time," and that the United States "should hold unshirkable responsibility
for exacerbating the tension in the Taiwan Strait." The Chinese charac-
terized the House Resolution as "a serious encroachment upon China's
sovereignty and gross interference in China's internal affairs."'"5
Meanwhile, on March 20, a Beijing-controlled Hong Kong newspaper
(Wei Wen Po) often used to float the mainland's opinions, asserted that
Chinese forces would need fewer than six hours to mount a successful in-
vasion; and on the next day, March 21, in a seeming response to Secre-
tary Perry's declaration and perhaps the House and Senate Resolutions
as well, the paper asserted that "[w]ith a concentrated fire of guided mis-
siles and artillery, the People's Liberation Army can bury an enemy in-
truder in a sea of fire," and "could deal a blow to the head of American
forces if they ventured through the Strait."' 5' Then, on March 22, Secre-
to redefine the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. See Leon Hadar, U.S. House Adopts
Resolution to Defend Taiwan, BUS. TIMES (Singapore), Mar. 21, 1996, at 5, available in
LEXIS, Busfin Library, Bustms File.
148. The list also included an advanced targeting and navigation system for fighter jets
and a package of electronic warfare devices, but did not include any submarines, which are
perennially requested by Taiwan. See Bradley Graham, U.S. Approves Arms Sales to Tai-
wan, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1996, at A24. For information on the Stinger missile, see
JANE'S WEAPONS SYSTEMS 1987-88, 212 (1987-88).
149. S. Con. Res. 43, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted); Senate Urges Review of Taiwan
Defense, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1996, at A28. The Clinton administration did not oppose
the language of the Senate Resolution, as it did that of the House. See Hadar, supra note
147, at 5.
150. Tan Tarn How, China Slams U.S. Decision to Sell Missiles to Taiwan, STRAITS
TIMES (Singapore), Mar. 22, 1996, at 1.
151. Seth Faison, China Threatens to 'Bury' U.S. Forces if They Come Too Close,
HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 22, 1996, at 18A.
1997]
Catholic University Law Review
tary Perry canceled his long-scheduled meeting with Chinese Defense
Minister Chi Haotian, stating that "[a] large scale official visit is not ap-
propriate in the current climate, ' and on the same day, the administra-
tion decided to extend informally its freeze on new financing of Ameri-
can business deals in China, which had been originally undertaken in
response to China's sale of sensitive nuclear-related technology to Paki-
stan. 53
Ultimately, the Taiwanese electorate was both incensed and embold-
ened by China's bald threat, and as a result the Chinese strategy back-
fired: the communists' nine-month effort to frighten the Taiwanese elec-
torate actually enhanced support for Lee Teng-hui, 54 and he won the
election by an unexpectedly wide margin."' Lee won fifty-four percent
of the vote and his closest challenger, Peng Ming-min of the Democratic
Progressive Party, who favored outright independence from China, won
twenty-one percent, while Lin Yang-kang and Chen Li-an, two challeng-
ers from the China New Party who advocated conciliatory positions to-
ward the mainland, won just fifteen percent and ten percent of the vote,
respectively.5 6 Thus, the combined vote of those who took a hard line
against Beijing-Mr. Lee and Mr. Peng-amounted to seventy-five per-
cent of eleven million ballots cast, ' which was widely seen as a sharp re-
152. Elaine Sciolino, White House Snubs China Over Military Maneuvers, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 1996, at 5. China had earlier insisted that Mr. Chi be given "red-carpet treat-
ment," including a White House meeting with President Clinton, however, a large number
of Republican members of Congress disapproved of the invitation because Mr. Chi had
been a key general during the repression of pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen
Square in 1989. See id. Some Republicans, however, had suggested that the 19-gun salute
planned for Mr. Chi at the Pentagon would have made excellent film footage for use in the
upcoming presidential campaign against Mr. Clinton. See id. The administration had ap-
parently attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the Chinese to reduce the event to a
"straight business trip," and to change the venue to Hawaii. Id. For their part, the Chi-
nese claimed that they had canceled the meeting in retaliation for Washington's show of
support for Taiwan. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Gargan, supra note 130 at 3; James Pringle, Peking Ends Military Manoeuvers
off Taiwan, TIMES (London), Mar. 26, 1996 at 11; Richburg, supra note 71, at A24;
Theresa Tan, China's Military Exercises Not Achieving Aim, Say Reports, STRAITS TIMES
(Singapore), Aug. 29, 1995, at 11, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Strait File; Patrick
E. Tyler, Tough Stance Toward China Pays Off for Taiwan Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,
1995, at Al.
155. See Simon Reeve, Taiwan Goes for Lee in China Snub, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 24,
1996, at 1; Tyler, supra note 1, at Al.
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buff to China's leadership and its tactics. In the meantime, the official
Chinese press duly reported the results of the election as occurring in as-
sociation with activities regarding a change of leadership in Taiwan and
properly credited Mr. Lee with fifty-four percent of the vote, while play-
ing down Mr. Peng's "pro-independence" share of the vote as lower than
anticipated'18 and enhancing the combined total of the candidates who
were conciliatory toward Beijing. 9 China continued its war games until
March 25, two days after the election and then withdrew without inci-
dent.
1 60
158. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (analyzing election results). A majority
of non-Chinese analysts concluded that a fair number of voters had defected from Mr.
Peng to Mr. Lee. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
159. See Furthering Relations Across Taiwan Straits Constitutes Greatest Popular Feel-
ing, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua
File; Seth Faison, China Says Taiwan Election Shows That Voters Oppose Separation From
The Mainland, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996, at 16.
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